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FINALITY AND HABEAS CORPUS: IS THE
RULE THAT RES JUDICATA MAY NOT APPLY
TO HABEAS CORPUS OR MOTION TO VACATE
STILL VIABLE?
MARILYN
I.

L. KELLEY*

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote of habeas corpus:
It is not the boasting of empty rhetoric that has treated the writ

of habeas corpus as the basic safeguard of freedom in the AngloAmerican world ....
...But the writ has potentialities for evil as well as for
good. Abuse of the writ may undermine the orderly administra-

tion of justice and therefore weaken the forces of authority that
are essential for civilization.'
This delicate balance between preservation of those elements of
the writ deemed essential to safeguard personal freedom and elimination of those abuses of the writ threatening the orderly administration of justice and necessary authority has neither been easy to
discover nor to maintain. It has been a problem nearly from the
beginning of the conception of the writ as one to enhance personal
liberty.2 This search for some balance between use and abuse of the
writ has been aggravated by the continuous flux in the function
and use of the writ. Perhaps with good reason, stability has not
been a hallmark of the writ, for the writ has been a major means
of adjusting and adapting law enforcement to the changing notions
of justice and due process.3 As a result, today, no less than at any
Article submitted in partial fulfillment of the J.S.D. degree, Columbia University.

* Assistant Professo of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; J.D.,
Wayne State University, 1971; LL.M., Columbia University, 1975.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (concurring opinion).
" See The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Char. II, c. 2; R. SOKOL, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS, § B, at 12-14 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as SOKOL].
3 See Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern
Writ-I, 18 Can. B. Rev. 10 (1940); Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q.
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other time during its existence as a remedy to challenge unlawful
detention, the writ of habeas corpus4 and its statutory counterpart,
28 U.S.C. § 2255, motion to vacate sentence,' present procedural
problems that threaten the orderly administration of justice. This
paper will discuss those procedural problems arising from the use
of the common law rule that res judicata may not apply to denials
of the writ of habeas corpus.
The rule that res judicata may not apply to denials of the writ
Rev. 64 (1902); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus, 64 Mich.
L. Rev. 451 (1966).
1 Habeas corpus, in this general context, refers to common law habeas corpus
as adopted in the United States Constitution, and its statutory grant to state
prisoners in 1867. See Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act
of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice
thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt
hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was
not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there
has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the
court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or re-sentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence
as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring
the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or
successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ
of habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall
not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for
relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court
has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
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has been venerated for nearly 300 years.' The United States Supreme Court, having adopted this rule simply as a matter of common law precedent,7 has, in more recent years, elevated the rule
to a constitutional requirement by deeming it "inherent in the very
role and function of the writ," and by implying that the would-be
application of res judicata to denials of the writ would be a
suspension prohibited by the Constitution.' Yet, retention of the
common law rule, in a court system with a hierarchical structure
unknown to the common law, has created enormous problems of
judicial administration since the rule requires that no one court
may make conclusive those issues of fact or law that are determined adversely to petitioners on habeas corpus or motion to vacate. 0
While general principles of decision-making emphasize finality in the law in order to obtain stability and certainty,I' the tradition of habeas corpus creates the possibility of litigation ad infini' See Goddard, A Note on Habeas Corpus, 65 L.Q. Rev. 30, 32 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Goddard].
See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924).
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963); ef. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
406, 422-23 (1963).
See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 & n.6 (1963); cf. Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963); and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
When in 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) (motion to vacate sentence) was
adopted, with the avowed purpose of providing an expeditious remedy for correcting
erroneous federal sentences without resort to habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970)
(Reviser's Note), the language appeared to deny federal prisoners access to habeas
corpus. To preserve the statute's constitutionality, in the face of a challenge that
it suspended the writ, see Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950),
the Supreme Court interpreted the statute as not, in fact, suspending the writ. See
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). Section 2255 was considered a
complete substitute for the constitutional right of habeas corpus, maintaining as
broad a scope, procedurally and substantively, as that guaranteed by habeas corpus. Id. at 219; accord, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962). One prior
procedure was that res judicata would not apply to denials of relief on habeas
corpus, Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924); accord, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 422-23 (1963), thus requiring reconsideration of the same issues where raised
on subsequent petitions. Since successive applications were always permissible
both at common law and under federal habeas corpus prior to the enactment of §
2255, successive applications on motion to vacate were considered proper and,
indeed, constitutionally required.
20 However, where the ends of justice would not be served by a reconsideration
of the issues, successive petitions may be barred. See Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. 1, 15 (1963). See discussion of this discretionary bar, pp. 13-20 infra.
"

See F. JAMES,

JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE,

§ 11.1, at 517-18 (1965).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 2

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

tum. Furthermore, as a consequence of the continuing expansion
of the concept of due process, ever-increasing numbers of judgments become subject to the common law prohibition against the
use of res judicata. But the more serious problem, directly related
to maintenance of the common law rule, is the ability of the habeas
or 2255 forum to overrule prior judgments of its own court of appeals,' 2 and theoretically, the United States Supreme Court.' 3
These complications necessitate re-evaluation of the common
law rule and its purported status as a constitutional requirement;
nevertheless, the Supreme Court has avoided the issue, choosing,
instead, to foreclose a limited number of collateral petitions by a
variety of devices, while maintaining the language of the common
law rule that res judicata may not apply.'4 It seems unlikely that
such a course can realistically be maintained since substantial
inroads have already been made against the common law rule by
use of these devices, all of which impliedly challenge the apparent
constitutional status of the rule. Foreclosure of collateral review
has been permitted, e.g., where a petitioner has deliberately failed
to exhaust his appellate remedies;' 5 where a petitioner has appealed, but has intentionally failed to raise all issues known to
him;'" where a petitioner has once litigated his claims collaterally
,2 See, e.g., Floyd v. United States, 365 F.2d 368, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1966).
' See Biggers v. Neil, 448 F.2d 91, 96-97 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 409 U.S. 188
(1972) (as to four-to-four decisions of the Supreme Court on certiorari to the direct
appeal for state prisoners). The validity of applying res judicata to actual adjudications by a majority of the Supreme Court, permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c)
(1970), was not ruled upon since the Court held that § 2244(c) was inapplicable to
the case before it, i.e., to four-to-four decisions of the Supreme Court.
" Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 190-91 (1972).
,5Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 & n.3 (1969) (dictum). This
rule, sometimes referred to as the exhaustion doctrine, is misleading where federal
prisoners are involved since exhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to collateral review for federal prisoners as it is for state prisoners. Compare 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) (1970) (for state prisoners) with 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) (for federal prisoners). Exhaustion is merely the expected course of action for a federal prisoner
seeking to correct alleged constitutional errors. See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S.
19 (1939). Exhaustion is enforced for federal prisoners only by the discretionary
power of the district court judge to refuse to hear petitions where there has been
no exhaustion of ordinary remedies.
11Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (dictum); accord, Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 & n.8 (1969) (dictum). The deliberate bypass rule
incorporates both complete failure to appeal and appeal with failure to raise all
issues known to petitioner at the time of appeal. This rule reinforces the general
rule of exhaustion by permitting a discretionary bar to issues that were not raised
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and, thereafter, seeks to litigate them on a subsequent petition;"7
where a federal petitioner has failed to raise an issue that was
required to be raised by pre-trial motion pursuant to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 12 (b)(2);11 and where a state petitioner has
actually adjudicated his claims by certiorari to the criminal appeal
in the United States Supreme Court and, thereafter, seeks to litigate them by habeas corpus in the district court. 9 Presumably,
none of these rules has any force or effect beyond denial of the
instant writ since petitioners barred by these rules are still procedurally free to return on a subsequent petition, raising the same
or different claims, owing to the continued Supreme Court acceptance of the rule that res judicata may not apply to habeas"0 or 2255
judgments."'
in the criminal appellate process where the § 2255 judge finds that the petitioner
intended to avoid the normal appellate process.
"1 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (dictum). The successive petitions doctrine permits a discretionary bar to relitigation of issues collaterally in a
second or successive petition where: (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant in a prior petition; (2)
the prior determination was on the merits; and (3) the ends of justice would not be
served by reaching the merits a second time. Id. at 15.
lB Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 248 (1973). This express waiver rule
has, apparently, very limited application, though the rationale used to support it
must inevitably collide with the general tradition of liberality in collateral litigation, heretofore thought to be constitutionally required. Impliedly, the express
waiver rule rejects the notion that application of res judicata to habeas litigation
is unconstitutional, though the issue was ignored by the Supreme Court when
adopting the waiver rule.
1 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970) states:
In a habeas corpus proceeding brought in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a prior judgment of the
Supreme Court of the United States on an appeal or review by a writ of
certiorari at the instance of the prisoner of the decision of such State
court, shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law with respect to an
asserted denial of a Federal right which constitutes ground for discharge
in a habeas corpus proceeding, actually adjudicated by the Supreme
Court therein, unless the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus shall
plead and the court shall find the existence of a material and controlling
fact which did not appear in the record of the proceeding in the Supreme
Court and the court shall further find that the applicant for the writ of
habeas corpus could not have caused such fact to appear in such record
by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
11Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 190 (1972); accord, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
422-23 (1963).
21 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963); accord, Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969) (by implication).
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In addition to these exceptions to the common law rule permitted by the Supreme Court, another set of exceptions has been
devised by various lower federal courts to bar all issues raised by
federal petitioners that have already been litigated in the federal
criminal appellate process. Thus, absolute foreclosure of a first
2255 petition may result from application of one of the following
formulae: that such litigation would be purposeless" or frivolous;"
or that such litigation would permit the motion to vacate to function as a second criminal appeal to which petitioner is not entitled. 24 Foreclosure of a first 2255 petition brought after criminal
appeal may also occur in some lower federal courts by exercise of
discretion,2 presumably on some similar ground as the Supreme
Court rule permitting a discretionary bar to relitigation of successive petitions, i.e., that such litigation would not serve the ends of
justice,2 1 or that weight may be given to the prior determination.Y
Barring the writ by the doctrine of res judicata has no historical support. And the common law rule, even as modified by the
Supreme Court, is contrary to such a bar. Nevertheless, the preclusionary rules devised by the lower federal courts go well beyond the
limited Supreme Court modifications. In effect, these various rules
permit res judicata to operate sub silentio with respect to issues
actually litigated in the federal criminal appellate process. Not
Blackwell v. United States, 429 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970).
Fuentes v. United States, 455 F.2d 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v. United
States, 420 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1970).
21 See Craig v. United States, 376 F.2d 1009, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965) (dictum); Medrano v. United
States, 315 F.2d 361, 362 (9th Cir. 1963); Franono v. United States, 303 F.2d 470,
472 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Thompson, 261 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1958).
2 Bearden v. United States, 403 F.2d 782, 784 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1111 (1969), where the court recognized that res judicata was inapplicable, but
then stated:
That is not to say, however, that every defendant who has been
unsuccessful on appeal can compel a re-trial of the same issues in a
collateral proceeding, since the courts in post-conviction relief applications may exercise a sound judicial discretion to decline to re-try issues
fully and finally litigated ....
Accord, Blackwell v. United States, 429 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970).
28 Compare Baca v. United States, 383 F.2d 154, 156 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 929 (1968), with Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
1 Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924) where the Court stated,
"[a]mong the matters which may be considered, and even given controlling
weight, are (a) the existence of another remedy ....
and (b) a prior refusal to
discharge on a like application."
2
2
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only do these rules challenge the validity of the common law rule,
but also, they challenge the supposed function to be served by
collateral review for federal prisoners. If issues heard in the federal
criminal appellate process may be barred from the civil collateral
process, i.e., motion to vacate, then federal criminal appeal has
displaced the traditional function of collateral review for federal
prisoners, raising the ultimate question: what ought motion to
vacate be for?
Strict application of the common law rule creates a certain
embarrassing chaos within the federal courts, permitting district
court judges to review the judgments of their own courts of appeals.
Moreover, the statute of 19481 requires federal petitioners to return to the same forum on collateral review in which they were
sentenced"9 (which is often the one in which they were tried and
convicted)," creating a feeling among district court judges that
they are duplicating their own trial work on collateral review and
are therefore wasting time."'
These conceptual difficulties are absent when federal judges
deal with state prisoners' petitions. While there is duplication of.
work already done by state court judges, it is not a duplication of
effort for the federal judge, at least not on the first habeas petition.
Furthermore, a federal judge may view the state court ruling on
federal constitutional questions of law inferior, particularly when
bolstered by the supremacy clause. Therefore, he may have little
compunction for overruling a state supreme court's interpretation
of the constitutional issues raised by a defendant. When, however,
the same questions are raised by federal prisoners, first in the
criminal process at trial and on direct appeal, and then in the civil
process by motion to vacate, a federal hierarchical crisis occurs.
Dare a district court judge on collateral attack overrule a decision
rendered on the criminal appeal that was adverse to the defendant? Is not the ruling on appeal of some force and effect, even if
- 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See note 5 supra.
29 Id.

11See Hoffa v. United States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1973); Eaton v. United
States, 458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1972); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1972); Odom v. United States, 455 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1972); Saros v. Richardson, 435 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1971); Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227 (5th
Cir. 1970); Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1969).
11See Blackwell v. United States, 429 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970).
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it is not permitted the effect of merger and bar or collateral estoppel?3"
Nothing has been written concerning the validity of the argument that the common law rule is constitutionally required, based
on either the premise that the rule is inherent in the writ or the
premise that application of res judicata would unconstitutionally
suspend the writ.3 More significant, the Supreme Court has applied the common law rule for nearly 200 years,34 dogmatically
asserting its necessity without ever examining, more than superficially, its origin, or rationale, if any, behind its use, or whether the
constitutional mandate against suspension of the writ was realistically intended to permit no procedural limitations to litigation ad
infinitum. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never considered
whether the rules used by the lower federal courts to bar issues
from collateral review solely because they have already been litigated on the criminal appeal are valid and consistent with the
common law rule.
Maintenance of both rules seems ludicrous since they are diametrically opposed and spawn opposite results. Either the common law rule is to be maintained with all its obvious consequences,
including the possibility of lower courts overruling on collateral
review the previous judgments made by appellate courts in the
criminal process, or the rules against duplicative litigation are to
be maintained, barring collateral review to all constitutional and
jurisdictional issues that either have been heard on appeal or could
have been heard, permitting some form of res judicata or collateral
estoppel to apply. Such a rule would thereby permit federal criminal appeal or certiorari to the criminal appeal to obviate the 2255
processl except for issues not raised in the criminal process where
failure to raise them was not intentional and express waiver of
those issues is not otherwise found.
32 An analogous problem occurs where state prisoners have first sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court to their criminal appeals from the state
courts, and have then brought petitions for habeas corpus in the United States
district court. Congress has, however, provided for this problem by amendment. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970). See note 19 supra.
"This latter argument has been suggested, but not evaluated. See SOKOL,
supra note 2, at 159.
3,See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963) and cases cited therein,
This would be in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970), note 19 supra,
which permits such a bar for state petitioners.
38 Kaufman v. United States, 194 U.S. 217 (1969).
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
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To evaluate better the viability of the common law rule, several historical developments within the law of habeas corpus
should briefly be mentioned. The development, adoption, and
modifications of the common law rule must be emphasized, paying
particular attention to the changing notions supporting the validity of this rule. Since the argument that the common law rule is
constitutionally required is of recent origin, the soundness of this
proposition must also be tested. And finally, if the common law
rule is not constitutionally required, consideration must be given
to the advisability of retaining it in the face of the serious administrative problems its retention creates.
II.

A.

THE COMMON LAW RULE

Historical Background
1.

England

The origin of the common law rule and its rationale are uncertain. All the English cases usually cited as precedent for the rule"
have simply recognized the existence of the rule and applied it,
giving no reason for the procedure.
Prior to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 there seems to be no
authority for the common law rule;" from this, one eminent English scholar, Lord Goddard, concludes that the practice did not
exist before then.' This conclusion is supported by the fact that
prior to 1679, King's Bench was the only court from which habeas
corpus as an independent cause of action could issue.4" Thus:
The practice of going from court to court ... seems to have
arisen solely as a consequence of ... [the Habeas Corpus] Act

which conferred the power of issuing the writ on the Chancellor

and on any of the judges or barons, and obliged them to do so.13

Certainly, concurrent, original jurisdiction was necessary in order
Cox v. Hakes, 15 App. Cas. 506, 527-28 (1890); Ex partePartington, 153 Eng.
Rep. 284, 285 (Ex. 1845); Burdett v. Abbot, 104 Eng. Rep. 501, 535 (K.B. 1811);
King v. Suddis, 102 Eng. Rep. 119, 122 (K.B. 1801).
3' 31 Char. II, c. 2.
" See Goddard, supra note 6, at 32.
'J Id.
42 Id. The courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer could issue writs of habeas
corpus in conjunction with the writ of privilege. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, in CASES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

261 (1965).

11Goddard, supra note 6, at 33.
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for the practice to exist, but it was not the determinative condition
since the common law courts had concurrent, original jurisdiction
over other causes of action as well, without the accompanying
common law rule." Much speculation on what that condition
might have been has been proffered, most of which Goddard rejects. The argument of Lord Bramwell in Cox v. Hakes," e.g., that
the practice probably arose because each court, while exercising
primary jurisdiction over the writ, would not necessarily have
known of the former applications in the other courts, is rejected by
Goddard since the respondent would certainly have known of the
prior actions and could easily have pleaded res judicata.1 Goddard
also rejects the notion of "any particular tenderness of the law in
favour of liberty"4 since the very reason that Parliament intervened and passed the Habeas Corpus Act was because of the reluctance to grant the writ by the Stuart Courts, which delayed and
evaded their obligation to do so whenever possible. 8 Finally, he
rejects Holdsworth's suggestion that the right to hearings de novo
was a happenstance result of the Act of 1679,48 saying that this does
not explain why the judgment rendered on the first petition was
not considered conclusive."
Goddard finally concludes that the practice rested on a technical rule of procedure, which existed until procedural reforms were
effected during the reign of Queen Victoria.' Prior to those reforms, the only method of challenging a decision of one of the
common law courts was by writ of error, which writ did not issue
for denials of the prerogative writs since they were not considered
judgments in the technical sense. There was, therefore, no procedure by which to challenge a denial of the writ of habeas corpus
except by the right to a hearing de novo in another court having
concurrent and original jurisdiction to issue the writ.2
" See Sayles, The Court of King's Bench in Law and History, in CASES ON THE

147-50 (1965); Sayles, Select Cases in the
Court of King's Bench, Edward II, in CASES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL
INSTITurIONS 150-53 (1965).
" 15 App. Cas. 506, 527 (1890).
,' Goddard, supra note 6, at 33.
, Id. at 34.
DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

I/d.

Id., citing 9 W.
'o

HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

112 (1903).

Goddard, supra note 6, at 34.

Id.
Id. at 34-36. Accord, Gordon, The Unruly Writ of Habeas Corpus, 26 Modern
L. Rev. 520, 523 (1963).
"

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss1/2

10

Kelley: Finality and Habeas Corpus: Is the Rule that Res Judicata May Not

HABEAS CORPUS

After procedural reforms had been effected, and the courts of
the common law had been merged into one High Court of Justice,
the common law rule, from the English point of view, no longer
made sense.53 Thus, in 1960, the rule was rejected." The writ now
issues from only one court;" each habeas applicant is entitled to
receive only one judgment on the merits of his petition unless
"fresh evidence" is, thereafter, adduced."
2.

United States

Chief Justice Marshall declared that "resort may unquestionably be had to the common law" 5 to determine the meaning and
extent of habeas corpus." Thus, on the strength of its tradition
alone, the common law rule was adopted into the American legal
system."
In 1924, the common law rule was challenged. In a wellreasoned opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the rule and its merits and concluded that it no longer served
any valid purpose."0 The Supreme Court, while affirming the result
in Wong Doo v. United States,' reprimanded the lower court for
13See Administration of Justice Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 14(2) in 40
222-23 (2d ed. 1961), Notes.
s Id. The Notes indicate that:
It was thought at one time that in case of refusal of habeas corpus
by one court or judge application might be made to another court or judge
even though the grounds urged were exactly the same; see 11 Halsbury's
Laws (3d ed.) 38, 39; and cf. the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679 (c.2), s. 2 vol.
6, p. 86. Recently, however, it was decided (at least so far as criminal
applications made in term time were concerned) that this was no longer
the case, and that, since the merger of the old common law courts and
the Court of Chancery in one High Court of Justice in 1873, an applicant
had no right to go from division to division or from judge to judge. (Re
Hastings (No. 2), [1958] 3 All E.R. 625; Re Hastings (No. 3), [1959]
ch. 368; [1959] I All E.R. 698; on appeal, [1959] 3 All E.R. 221, C.A.).
Canada has also rejected the common law rule. See Can. Rev. Stat. c. 51, §
719(3) (1970), amending Can. Rev. Stat. c. 51, § 691 (1970). The language follows
closely that of the English statute.
See 11 HALSBURy'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 38 (3rd ed. 1955).
-.
Administration of Justice Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 14(2); accord,
Can. Rev. Stat. c. 51, § 719(3) (1970), amending, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 51, § 691 (1970).
' Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 207,

'Id.

s'See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924).
60 See Wong Sun v. United States, 293 F. 273 (6th Cir. 1923), aff'd sub. nom.
Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924) (on a different ground).
81265 U.S. 239 (1924).
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having applied res judicata, citing Salinger v. Loisel,6 2 a case decided on the same day as Wong Doo. In Salinger, the Supreme
Court had stated that:
At common law the doctrine of resjudicatadid not extend to a
decision on habeas corpus refusing to discharge the prisoner
... .[This Court has conformed to [this rule] and thereby
sanctioned it . . 3. .We regard the rule as well established in
this jurisdiction.
In 1963, the rule, as applied to the statutory remedy of motion
to vacate, was impliedly challenged in United States v. Sanders,64
when the District Court for the Northern District of California
refused to entertain a second petition pursuant to § 2255, saying:
As there is no reason given, or apparent to this Court, why
petitioner could not, and should not, have raised the issue of
mental incompetency at the time of his first motion, the Court
will refuse, in the exercise of its statutory discretion, to entertain the present petition.6 5
The Court of Appeals affirmed.66
The Supreme Court reversed,67 holding that the District Court
should have entertained the second petition, basing its decision on
the relitigation requirement imposed by the common law rule."
This time, however, the Court asserted a new and stronger ground
for the rule than that given in Salinger.With an omniscience typical of the Court in 1963, the Supreme Court made certain that
which no one could have known before: the common law rule was
constitutionally required. Rejecting the rationale in Salinger that
the rule "derive[d] from the fact that at common law habeas
corpus judgments were not appealable,"" the Court asserted that:
[The rule's] roots would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty
is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.
If "government .. .[is] always [to] be accountable to the
62265 U.S. 224 (1924).
63

Id. at 230.

Unreported opinion, quoted in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 6 (1963).
" 373 U.S. at 6.
6

297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1961).
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).

6

Id. at 7.

6

Id. at 8.
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judiciary for a man's imprisonment," Fay v. Noia, supra, at
402, access to the courts on habeas must not be thus impeded.10
The Court then concluded that "[t]he inapplicability of res
judicata. . . is inherent in the very role and function of the writ."
Furthermore, the Court suggested that "serious constitutional
questions"7 2 with regard to suspension of the writ would arise were
the newer statutory remedies for collateral review "construed to
derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ of habeas corpus
''73

B.

Supreme Court Modifications of the Traditional Use of the
Common Law Rule

The traditional use of the common law rule that res judicata
may not apply to denials74 of habeas corpus must be considered
separately since the rule is found in other contexts as well, compounding the administrative problems of the federal courts. These
other contexts will be discussed shortly.
While application of res judicata to denials of relief by habeas
corpus is still considered impermissible, the common law rule has
proved so impracticable that the Supreme Court has found it necessary to provide some principles of finality, though they fall short
of any automatic bar. In fact, those cases that most strongly support the common law rule have also provided the major modifications of that rule. Two distinct modifications are used, depending
on whether the issue raised on a subsequent petition has actually
been litigated previously, or whether the issue could or should have
been litigated previously, but was not.
70 Id.

7IId.
72 Id. at 12.

11 Id. at 11.

Noting that the literal language of § 2255 permits the 2255 forum to decline to
reach the merits of a petition where the petitioner seeks "similar relief" for a second
time, the Court insisted that this could not be taken literally since if § 2255 permitted application of res judicata, the statute would be unconstitutional. The Court
then concluded by attacking any "substantial procedural hurdles" that would make
§ 2255 "less swift and imperative than federal habeas corpus" since such hurdles
would create the "gravest constitutional doubts" about their validity. Id. at 14.
7,A grant of relief on habeas corpus was traditionally res judicata. Goddard,
supra note 6, at 31, 36; see Cox v. Hakes, 15 App. Cas. 506 (1890).
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1. Issues Actually Adjudicated on PriorPetitions
The first holding by the Supreme Court that res judicata may
not apply to denials of the writ of habeas corpus came in Salinger
v. Loisel.15 In that case, a warrant had been issued in South Dakota
for the arrest of Salinger. He was found in Iowa where he posted
bond, but failed thereafter to appear in South Dakota. He was
subsequently arrested in New York for hearing on a warrant of
removal to South Dakota. At that time, he applied for a writ of
habeas corpus, challenging the legality of the warrant of removal.
After hearing, the New York District Court dismissed the writ and
issued the warrant of removal; the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that order.76
Salinger then posted a second bond for his appearance in
South Dakota. Again, he failed to appear. Shortly thereafter, he
surrendered to the marshal in New Orleans after which he applied
for a second writ of habeas corpus, alleging the same ground as that
determined adversely to him in New York. He was admitted to bail
pending hearing on the writ, but was immediately re-arrested for
failure to appear on the bond given in New York. Without waiting
for the hearing on the second writ, SalingCr applied for a third writ,
the second in New Orleans, and was again admitted to bail pending hearing on that writ.
All these prior proceedings were produced in evidence at the
hearing in New Orleans after which the district judge discharged
both writs, remanding Salinger to the marshal's custody. Salinger
appealed and asked for a supersedeas to stay execution of the
warrant of removal pending determination on appeal. The supersedeas was granted; however, the marshal took Salinger into custody, intending to execute the warrant. Salinger then applied for
a fourth writ of habeas corpus, the third in New Orleans, alleging
the same grounds as alleged in the first three, and additionally,
alleging that his detention under the warrant of removal was in
contravention of the supersedeas. After a hearing on the fourth
writ, the district court discharged the writ. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the discharge."
On certiorari in the Supreme Court, respondent argued that
75 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
76 Ex parte Salinger, 288 F. 752 (2d Cir. 1923).

11Salinger v. United States, 295 F. 498 (5th Cir. 1923), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
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the determination in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was res
judicata. The Supreme Court held that res judicata was inapplicable to denials of relief on habeas corpus solely on the basis of
precedent, though the Supreme Court noted that it had never
announced an "express decision on the point.""T
Nonetheless, the Court was willing to permit discharge of the
fourth writ on the basis of the prior decisions on the merits saying:
[lit does not follow that a refusal to discharge on one application is without bearing or weight when a later application is
being considered ....
• ..Among the matters which may be considered, and
even given controlling weight, are (a) the existence of another
remedy. ..and (b) a prior refusal to discharge on a like appli7
cation.

1

The facts in Salinger were, admittedly, absurd. Some principle of finality should have been announced as, indeed, one was.
What is difficult to understand is the Supreme Court's reasoning
in refusing to apply the doctrine of res judicata. No holding had
ever been announced in the Supreme Court that the doctrine of res
judicata could not apply. At best, it was only assumed to be the
rule,"° or was dictum,' or was asserted in dissenting opinion."
,1Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924).
1,Id. at 230-31.

Compare Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496 (1900) with Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U.S. 365 (1902), where the same issue, double jeopardy, was heard and ruled
upon twice in the United States Supreme Court without any mention of res judicata
or the common law rule.
1,See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1915), where the Supreme
Court recognized the general principle of finality, saying:
It is not easy to see why appellant is not, upon general principles, bound
by [the Supreme Court of Georgia's] decision. It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence, arising from the very nature of courts of justice and
the objects for which they are established, that a question of fact or of
law distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot afterwards be disputed between the same parties
'
The principle is as applicable to the decisions of criminal courts
as to those of civil jurisdiction.
The Court in Frank avoided the issue by asserting that it was not necessary to
invoke the doctrine of res judicata for purposes of the case, not because of any
common law rule, but because of the "impropriety of limiting ... the authority of
the courts of the United States in investigating an alleged violation by a State of
...due process of law.
82 See

.

." Id. at 334.

In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 147 (1852) (Nelson, J., dissenting

opinion).
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Thus, precedent was not so strong that the Court should have felt
obligated to honor it. More striking, however, the Court recognized
the oft assumed rationale for the rule, that it existed because there
was no right of appeal from a denial of habeas corpus at common
law. The Court stated:
In early times, when a refusal to discharge was not open to
appellate review, courts and judges were accustomed to exercise
an independent judgment on each successive application, regardless of the number. But when a right to an appellate review
was given, the reason for that practice ceased, and the practice
came to be materially changed . .

..

Since the rationale for the inapplicability of res judicata no longer
existed, and since no holding that the common law rule was to be
honored in the federal courts had ever been announced, it is most
peculiar that the Court did not permit application of res judicata.
The only hint given for the decision is the Court's statement that
"the rules

. . .

here.

. .

outlined will accord to the writ of habeas

corpus its recognized status as a privileged writ of freedom, and yet
make against an abusive use of it."84 This is not an adequate explanation since no argument suggested that the writ would have
lost its privileged status as a writ of freedom were res judicata to
have applied to Salinger's bid for his fourth writ.
Since the adoption of § 2255, the Supreme Court has reconfirmed the Salinger rule and made it applicable to denials of relief
on 2255 petitions. In Sanders v. United States,85 the Supreme
Court said:
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application
for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same
ground presented in the subsequent application was determined
adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2)the prior
determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice
would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent
application."'
The major weakness of this discretionary rule is the implied
assumption that discretion will always be exercised to give weight
to the prior decision, and that the district judge will decline to
relitigate issues determined adversely to petitioner by the court of
13

Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1924).

1,Id. at 232.

373 U.S. 1 (1963).
91Id. at 25.
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appeals. However, since a district judge is "permitted, [but] not
compelled"87 to refuse to relitigate issues determined adversely to
petitioner on a prior petition, the district judge may equally choose
to rehear and redetermine issues actually adjudicated previously.
Thus, the discretionary rule does not resolve the problem suggested in the introduction, that the habeas or 2255 judge has, by
virtue of the common law rule, the power to review prior decisions
of his own court of appeals and to overrule those decisions. If this
conclusion is countered by the argument that it would be an abuse
of discretion to rehear the same issues of law on the same facts as
those presented to the court of appeals, then the discretionary rule
becomes indistinguishable from res judicata or collateral estoppel
since it would always be impermissible to relitigate the same issues
on the same facts as those heard by the court of appeals.
The exercise of discretion to relitigate may result in the comic
tragedy exemplified by United States ex rel. Schnitzler v.
Follettem In that case, the District Court had originally granted a
writ of habeas corpus (to a state petitioner), 9 which judgment had
then been reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."
Thereafter, petitioner applied for a second writ in the District
Court, alleging the same facts and arguing that the decision of the
Court of Appeals had been erroneous." Assuming the applicability
of the common law rule, the lower court had power to rehear and
to rule contrary to the Court of Appeals. And that was precisely
what the District Court did. The State appealed; the Court of
Appeals held on two grounds that the District Court was not entitled to grant relief on the second petition. Both grounds were
weak. First, the Court of Appeals held that under the gsandersrule
the District Court could have refused to entertain the second petition;94 but, second, the court held that "in light of [its] prior
decision . . . the district court was required not to entertain the
application." 5 This rationale was asserted in the face of a concession that res judicata was inapplicable. The court stated:
'T

"
"

Id. at 12.

406 F.2d 319
267 F. Supp.
379 F.2d 846
290 F. Supp.

(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969).
337 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd 379 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1967).
(2d Cir. 1967).
359 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969).

Id.
I2
'3

406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969).

"

Id. at 321.

95 Id.
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While res judicata does not apply to successive applications
Judge Croake was bound to follow our prior decision, rendered
upon factual and legal background identical to that before the
district court, under the common principle of stare decisis. In
this case, as in all others, the district court is required to follow
a binding precedent of a superior court, and it abused its discretion in declining to do so."
This rationale merely begs the question by assuming that the former judgment was binding on the lower court." Moreover, the
Court of Appeals was incorrect in its application of stare decisis to
this case. Since the parties and the issues of law and fact in the
second petition were exactly the same as those in the first petition,
the doctrine of stare decisis was inapplicable. 8 Finally, the Court
of Appeals was attempting, by substitution of doctrines, to obtain
the same enfect as that obtainable by res judicata, the application
of which was admittedly impermissible. Therefore, it hardly mattered which label was given to the bar; the bar should have been
equally impermissible.
2.

Issues That Could or Should have been Adjudicated on Prior
Petitions

On the same day that Salinger was decided, the Supreme
Court denied a second petition in Wong Doo v. United States,"
relying on the Salinger argument that while res judicata is
inapplicable to habeas corpus, weight may be given to prior refusals of relief. Thus, while the Supreme Court reprimanded the lower
court for having applied the "inflexible doctrine of res judicata,'"I"
it reached the same result as the lower court by finding that the
petitioner had placed the claim of the second petition in issue on
the first petition; had had ample opportunity to offer his proofs on
the first petition with regard to that claim; and had intentionally
abandoned the claim on the first petition.' Therefore, petitioner
"

Id. at 322.

This was precisely the issue to be determined, i.e., whether a prior refusal
of relief by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals could bind the district court,
requiring the district judge to refuse to grant relief on a subsequent similar petition.
The Sanders rule does not make such a provision.
,1Stare decisis merely asserts that, in the future, questions of law between
parties not bound to the present case will be decided the same as the present case
if the facts are substantially the same. See R. MOORE, STARE DEcisis 7-8 (1958).
: 265 U.S, 239 (1924).
10Id. at 241.
101
Id.
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was presumed to be lacking "good faith" ' and to be making "an
abusive use of the writ of habeas corpus";" 3 for these reasons, the
petition was barred, and the judgment below affirmed.
This rule was refined in Price v. Johnston, 4 where the Court
distinguished the facts of gwong Doo, saying that the record had
been clear in Wong Doo that the proofs were available; whereas,
in Price, though petitioner had had prior knowledge of the issue
that was belatedly raised on his fourth petition, it was not clear
from the record whether he had had access to his proofs before his
fourth petition; thus, he was entitled to demonstrate that he had
not abused the writ by offering some good reason for his failure to
litigate the issue previously." 5
Finally, in Sanders v.United States,' the Supreme Court
applied the Salinger rule to 2255 petitions, but limited the use of
discretion to deny subsequent petitions to those issues that have
actually been adjudicated previously. 7 Therefore, no weight may
be given to the denial of a prior petition unless the issues raised in
the subsequent petition are the same as those adjudicated in the
prior petition.
None of these cases required maintenance of the common law
rule in order to achieve their results. Once the Court had determined in Wong Doo that petitioner was not entitled to litigate the
specific issue raised on the second petition, there was no good
reason why that decision should not have been res judicata. Moreover, the Court need only have determined that petitioner's claim
could or should have been brought previously and was therefore
barred. This is, in effect, precisely what the Court determined. The
Court simply went one step further, reasoning that petitioner's
failure to litigate an issue, which he really could have litigated,
created a presumption of bad faith that barred him from litigating
his claim. In Price,the Court ruled that the presumption could be
102

Id.

Id.
104 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
IcOId. at 291. Salingerwas held inapplicable because the issue in Pricehad not
actually been litigated on any prior petition. This distinction was a new one since
the Court in Wong Doo relied on Salinger, arguing that weight could be given to
the prior refusal of relief despite the fact that the issue had never actually been
litigated.
373 U.S. 1 (1963).
103

20

Id. at 9.
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overcome by petitioner's demonstration of some good cause for the
failure to litigate timely an issue known to him. Yet, these cases
turn upon a simple interpretation of whether the issues really could
have been litigated previously. In Price and Sanders, the Court
need only have found that petitioners' proofs were not available on
the prior petitions and were, therefore, not precluded by res judicata. Had the proofs been available, there is no reason why the
Court could not have liberally construed the meaning of "could or
should have brought" in order to avoid barring the writ if injustice
would otherwise have been the result. 08
These cases conclude the case law development of the common law rule as traditionally understood. While little rationale
remains for the traditional use of the common law rule; it has been
argued that the ill effects created by retention of the rule are limited, or at least controllable, by use of the successive petitions
doctrine as set forth in Sanders v. United States.' The (V
Schnitzler case, however, offers demonstrative proof of the ineffectiveness of the successive petitions doctrine.
More important, the successive petitions doctrine was not designed to control the problem of duplicative litigation brought
through the courts by use of the variety of remedial devices currently available to petitioners, e.g., pre-trial motions, post-trial
motions, criminal appeal, writ of certiorari and habeas corpus or
motion to vacate sentence. All these remedies are potentially
available to petitioners, none precluding the use of another."'
Given this variety of remedies, should not one mode of review be
permitted to preclude the use of another, especially where petitioners seek to litigate issues by a second mode of review after
they have already had those claims adjudicated by a different
mode of review? Logically, should not petitioners be limited to
one mode of review where that mode was sufficient to examine
the issues fully?
'" Petitioner should not be barred, e.g., from raising claims belatedly where
there is a showing that the claim was not raised due to incompetency of counsel;
see Barnes v. Florida, 402 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 969 (1969);
Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); or that rights were waived due to
counsel's conflict of interests. See Whitaker v. Warden, 362 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1966).
' 373 U.S. 1 (1963); see SOKOL, supra note 2, § 21.5 at 159.
", There is a trend toward permitting one form of review to preclude another,
see discussion of certiorari, pp. 33-46 infra; and also permitting the failure to exercise one form of review to preclude the exercise of another. See discussion of pretrial motions, pp. 39-49 infra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss1/2

20

Kelley: Finality and HABEAS
Habeas Corpus:
Is the Rule that Res Judicata May Not
CORPUS

C. Extention of the Common Law Rule to Denials of Relief on
Certiorari to the Criminal Appeal and Its Subsequent Statutory
Modification
It should be recalled that at common law there was neither
appe/l from the criminal judgment,"' nor appeal from the denial
of relief on habeas corpus."' The common law rule provided a
means of reviewing the denial of relief on habeas corpus in the
absence of appellate review, and habeas corpus itself provided a
means of reviewing the criminal judgment. Habeas corpus was,
nonetheless, a limited review, i.e., the only issue reviewable on
habeas corpus was the jurisdiction of the criminal court to try the
case; all other issues were necessarily final. And this initial review
by habeas corpus was not governed by the common law rule;
rather, it was governed by the rule that void judgments may be
impeached."' In contrast, the common law rule was intended only
to permit review of the denial of the writ itself. However, a slight
misstatement of the rule by American courts has led to misapplication and extension of the common law rule. Misstated, the rule
asserts that res judicata may not apply to habeas corpus."' This
misstatement leads to the inevitable conclusion that no issue cognizable on habeas corpus can be determined with finality prior to
M 1 W. HoLSwoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 125-26 (2d ed. 1914). Prior to
1705, the writ of error issued in criminal cases only as a matter of royal grace. In
Regina v. Paty, 91 Eng. Rep. 431 (K.B. 1705), the court held that the crown could
not deny the writ in misdemeanor cases. However, even where the writ issued as a
matter of right, the procedure was so cumbersome and the bases of review were so
limited that the writ was of little practical advantage and was subsequently abolished in 1907. In the United States, the Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat.
655, permitted appeal from federal capital cases to the Supreme Court by writ of
error, but limited the review to jurisdictional questions; the Act of Mar. 3, 1891,
ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 828, created circuit courts of appeal, and granted the right of
direct appeal from federal district courts to the circuit courts on writ of error.
"I Goddard, supra note 6.
213 At common law, the habeas forum could not examine a conviction for any
purpose other than to verify that the committing court had valid jurisdiction. See
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830) where Chief Justice Marshall
wrote: "The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive
on all the world as the judgment of this court would be....
* * ' An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject matter, although it should be erroneous."
"I See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 190 (1972) where the Court states that
"res judicata [is] inapplicable"; and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) where
the Court states that "resjudicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings."
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the habeas process; thus, a two-tiered process is required: the habeas process becomes automatic, no longer extraordinary, but routine.
Given the misstatement, certiorari to the criminal appeal
presents three problems for the habeas or 2255 forum: (1) the
meaning to be given a denial of certiorari; (2) the meaning to be
given a grant of certiorari with a judgment rendered by an evenly
divided court; and (3) the meaning to be given an actual adjudication of petitioner's claims by a majority of the Supreme Court on
certiorari to the criminal appeal. In discussing these problems, one
further issue should be considered: whether the meaning given to
any of the above three situations should vary, depending on
whether petitioner is a state or a federal prisoner.
1. Denial of Certiorari
The law is settled that denial of certiorari cannot be taken to
mean that the Supreme Court has expressed an opinion on the
merits of the petition."' But what does denial of certiorari say
about the opinion of the lower court that is left undisturbed by the
denial? It certainly is not to be deemed "approval of the decision." ' This is so because denial may rest on a variety of factors,
in particular, that the decision, whether right or wrong, does not
present "questions of sufficient gravity" ' for determination on
certiorari.
Where the federal constitutional claims of a state petitioner
have never been considered by a federal court, the state criminal
appellate decision is given no finality."' This conclusion rested, in
Brown v. Allen,"' not on the common law rule, but on the statute
of 1867 and the supremacy clause.' 0 However, in Fay v. Noia,"' the
115Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492, 497 (1953); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174,
181 (1947).
",Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953).
"7

Id. at 491.

Id. at 500. This argument is subject to the caveats of the deliberate bypass
and adequate state ground rules. For a discussion of these two limitations on the
right to seek a review by habeas corpus, see SOKOL, supra note 2, at 159-71.
"' 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
' Id. at 500; see Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248-50 (1886). The issues
presented to the district court in Brown on habeas corpus had been the same issues
as those presented to the United States Supreme Court on certiorari to the criminal
appeal, which petition had been denied. The habeas forum, in dismissing the petition, had said:
",
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Supreme Court held that denial of relief in the state court could
be given no finality due to the "familiar principle that res judicata
is inapplicable in habeas proceedings, 111 2 citing the "classic English practice"'2 in support of that principle. This is a clear misstatement and misapplication of the classic English practice upon
which the Supreme Court claimed to rely.
If the Brown rationale alone is relied upon for refusal to grant
finality to state criminal judgments, then denial of certiorari to a
federal prisoner's petition ought to be distinguishable in one of
several respects: either the federal prisoner's right to collateral
review arises pursuant to Article I, Section 9, of the United States
Constitution, with its attendant common law rule, and the law
with regard to state prisoners is therefore inapposite;'24 or the right
While action of the Virginia courts and the denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court were not binding on the principle of res judicata, they
were matters entitled to respectful consideration ...

and in the absence

of some most unusual situation, they were sufficient reason for [the]
court to deny a further writ of habeas corpus.
Brown v. Crawford, 98 F. Supp. 866, 868 (E.D.N.C. 1951).
All the justices but Mr. Justice Jackson, who concurred in the result, were
agreed that denial of certiorari was not res judicata, barring the issues on a
subsequent habeas corpus petition. But they disagreed on the rationale for that
rule. The minority stated: "In fields other than habeas corpus with its unique
opportunity for repetitious litigation . . . the denial would make the issues res
judicata." Brown v. Allen, supra at 456. However, the minority would have permitted weight to be given a denial of certiorari, on a sufficiently developed record, thus,
applying the Salinger rule for successive petitions to a first petition raising claims
fully considered on certiorari to the criminal appeal. Id. at 457. This position was
rejected by the majority who asserted:
If we were to sanction a rule directing the District Courts to give any
effect to a denial of certiorari, let alone the effect of resjudicatawhich is
the practical result of the position of the Fourth Circuit, we would be
ignoring actualities recognized ever since certiorari jurisdiction was conferred upon this Court more than sixty years ago.
.. . The governing consideration was authority in the Court to decline to review decisions which, right or wrong, do not present questions
of sufficient gravity.
Id. at 491. Mr. Justice Jackson, who would have permitted res judicata to apply,
noted in his concurring opinion that "[i]t is sometimes said that res judicata has
no application whatever in habeas corpus cases and surely it does not apply with
all of its conventional severity." Id. at 543.
121372 U.S. 391 (1963).
' Id. at 423.

in Id. at 422-23 & n.32.

121See Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion), cited with approvalin Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 23031 (1969).
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to relitigate under the Brown rationale rests on the right to have
one's day in a federal forum on federal constitutional claims, and
the federal prisoner has, by definition, already had his claims adjudicated in a federal forum;" 5 or, in any event, the common law rule
is inapplicable to denials. of relief on certiorari, but for the Brown
rationale all criminal judgments would be binding, and since
Brown applies only to state criminal judgments, the judgment of
a federal court of appeals ought to stand with finality in the face
of a denial of certiorari, binding the district court to the appellate
court ruling as a matter of law of the circuit until the Supreme
Court ultimately approves or disapproves the rule of law. A similar
point with respect to this last argument was made by Mr. Justice
Jackson when he wrote in Brown:
The fatal sentence that in real life writes finis to many causes
cannot in legal theory be a complete blank. I can see order in
the confusion as to its meaning only by distinguishing its
significance under the doctrine of stare decisis, from its effect
under the doctrine of res judicata. I agree that, as stare decisis,
denial of certiorari should be given no significance whatever. It
creates no precedent and approves no statement of principle
entitled to weight in any other case. But, for the case in which
certiorari is denied, its minimum meaning is that this Court
allows the judgment below to stand with whatever consequences it may have upon the doctrine of res judicata ....121
The majority opinion in Brown had held that denial of certiorari could not be interpreted to mean that the issue was foreclosed
on habeas corpus by res judicata since "denial of certiorari cannot
be interpreted as an 'expression of opinion on the merits.' ""
leaves confused the distinction, made by Mr. Justice Jackson, between stare decisis and res judicata. But the opinion, as expressed
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, made clear that the decision not to
apply res judicata to state criminal judgments rested on the supremacy clause and not on the common law rule. The Court reasoned that:
Insofar as this jurisdiction enables federal district courts to entertain claims that State Supreme Courts have denied rights
" In Kaufman, this argument was rejected
22 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 543 (1953)

by the majority. 394 U.S. at 228.
(concurring opinion). Mr. Justice
Jackson believed, however, that both state and federal criminal judgments should
be res judicata.in the face of a denial of certiorari. Id.
121
Id. at 497.
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guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is not a case
of a lower court sitting in judgment on a higher court. It is
merely one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution whereby federal law is higher than State law.ln
Leaving, for the moment, the question of whether the doctrine
of res judicata would be the correct principle of finality to apply,
it seems clear that some principle of finality, at least in the instance of federal appellate court rulings, should apply. Were the
Fay rationale for refusal to grant finality to criminal judgments
valid, it would be equally applicable to federal criminal judgments; as a result, it would become possible for the 2255 forum to
review and overrule prior federal criminal appellate court judgments. Were the Brown rationale to apply, federal criminal judgments would become distinguishable from state criminal judgments: denial of certiorari to a state petitioner would give no finality to the state judgment and should not preclude a subsequent
habeas corpus petition; whereas, denial of certiorari to a federal
petitioner should permit the judgment of the court of appeals to
stand, precluding a subsequent 2255 petition that challenged issues already litigated in the criminal appellate process. Unfortunately, this confusion in the rationale for the rule denying finality
to criminal judgments in the face of a denial of certiorari has never
been clarified by the Supreme Court.'
2. Four-to-four Decisions of the Supreme Court on Certiorarito
the CriminalAppeal
In 1966, Congress amended the statutory remedy of habeas
corpus for state prisoners 3 ' with the intention of providing "a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata. '1 3' According to
that provision, where a state prisoner seeks relief for an alleged
denial of a federal constitutional right by application for the writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, any actual adjudication rendered by the Court shall be "conclusive as to all issues
of fact or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right
''132

,n Id. at 510.
'' See Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970), supra note 19.
"' 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3663, 3664 (1966) quoting S. REP. No. 1797,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); cf. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191 & n.1 (1972).
In 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970), supra note 19. Had this circumstance been
clearly governed by the Brown rationale, there would have been no need for this
"
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In Neil v. Biggers,"' the Supreme Court held that a four-tofour decision of the Supreme Court on certiorari to the criminal
appeal is not an "actual adjudication" on the merits of the issues
considered and, therefore, does not fall within the purview of the
statute. 3 ' Thus, four-to-four decisions, like denial of certiorari, are
not entitled to any res judicata effect. Again, the Supreme Court
referred to the common principle that res judicata may not apply
to habeas proceedings, but failed to indicate whether the rationale
for the rule rested on Brown or on Fay. Impliedly, however, the
inapplicability of res judicata to habeas corpus rested on the
Brown rationale since the Court indicated that were there an actual adjudication of the merits on certiorari, the state prisoner
would have had the federal adjudication to which he was entitled
and would be precluded from seeking relitigation of the issues on
habeas corpus. If the decision does, in fact, rest on Brown, then
where federal prisoners are involved, a split decision, like a denial
of certiorari, should permit the criminal judgment of the court of
appeals to stand as law of the circuit, binding the district court on
any subsequent motion to vacate on those issues previously adjudicated. "'
3. Actual Adjudication on Certiorarito the CriminalAppeal
If the Supreme Court considers § 2244(c) constitutional, 3 ' i.e.,
not violative of the common law rule, then § 2244(c) is consistent
with the Brown rationale, but not that of Fay: habeas corpus for
state prisoners is only necessary in order to provide uniformity in
interpretation of federal law; uniformity may equally be achieved
by adjudication on certiorari or on habeas corpus in the federal
system; therefore, one adjudication in the federal system, either by
certiorari or by habeas corpus, is sufficient. Thus, all issues of fact
and law that have been actually adjudicated on certiorari may be
statute since actual adjudication on certiorari would have been the day in a federal

forum to which a state petitioner was entitled, foreclosing a subsequent review of
the same issues on habeas corpus.
"'

409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Id. at 192.

" This argument, distinguishing state from federal prisoners, runs counter,
however, to the Supreme Court's position in Kaufman that the two collateral remedies for state and federal prisoners are "exactly commensurate." 394 U.S. 217, 222

(1969); accord, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962).

,"I See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (dictum) (by implication).
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given finality, precluding a subsequent habeas petition raising the
same claims. 3 '
If the common law rule is considered inapplicable in this instance, then one of several conclusions may follow. Assuming the
constitutionality of § 2244(c), this statute establishes a distinction
between habeas corpus for state prisoners and motion to vacate for
federal prisoners: the right to habeas corpus for state prisoners
arises from the statute of 1867 pursuant to the supremacy clause
and is therefore unattended by the common law rule. This conclusion rejects the Supreme Court position espoused in Kaufman and
Sanders that the statutory remedies for state and federal prisoners
are "exactly commensurate."' 38 Moreover, this conclusion rejects
the rationale for the inapplicability of res judicata, espoused in
Fay.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court continues to maintain that the statutory remedies for state and federal prisoners are
exactly commensurate, then even though there is no comparable
provision in § 2255 for federal prisoners to that in, § 2244(c) for
state prisoners, a similar limitation on federal prisoners' petitions
should follow. It should be noted, however, that the argument that
these remedies are commensurate does not need to be maintained
in order to reach this result. One only need argue that the common
law rule is equally inapplicable to denials of relief on certiorari
whether the adjudication concerns a state or a federal prisoner. If
this latter position is taken, then certiorari, as a post-criminal
judgment remedy, is permitted to displace the traditional civil
collateral remedy provided by habeas corpus and motion to vacate
sentence, at least with respect to issues actually adjudicated. This
should not be an astounding result, however, since the right of
review by certiorari did not exist for criminal judgments at the
time the traditional role of habeas corpus was being developed.
InThe language of § 2244(c) implies that redevelopment of the facts on habeas
corpus, permitted under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), would be limited

since the statute permits factual reconsideration only where "the applicant...
shall plead and the court shall find the existence of a ... controlling fact which
did not appear in the record ...in the Supreme Court and ...the applicant...
could not have caused such fact to appear ... by the exercise of reasonable diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970). Clearly, the discretion of a federal district judge,

under Townsend to relitigate facts would be precluded.
" Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 222 (1969); accord, Sanders v.

United States, 373 U.S. 1, 13 (1963).
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Certainly, direct review should be coordinated with habeas corpus
and motion to vacate to avoid judicial confusion.
Summary
Since the common law rule does not assert that res judicata
may not apply to denials of relief on certiorari, the rationale in Fay
must be rejected if there is to be sound judicial administration of
the criminal justice system. Moreover, there is no valid reason why
these two statutory remedies for state and federal prisoners should
be commensurate in all respects. Habeas corpus for state prisoners
involves the relationship of different legal institutions from those
regulated by motion to vacate. Thus, different administrative
problems and considerations should be involved in creating procedural limitations for these two remedies.'39 To conclude that these
remedies are exactly commensurate would require relitigation of
issues for both state and federal prisoners where there has been a
denial of certiorari or a grant of certiorari with a decision rendered
by an evenly divide court. This requirement would permit federal
district courts to relitigate issues actually adjudicated in the criminal process by federal courts of appeals. Avoidance of this problem
requires rejection, to some degree, of the philosophy expressed in
Kaufman that the purpose of habeas corpus is not simply to provide a federal forum on federal constitutional claims, but to provide an independent review of the criminal process in order to
insure the integrity of that process.'40 The Court in Neil v. Biggers
rejects this philosophy, with respect to state petitioners, when it
says that one hearing in a federal forum is all that the state petitioner is entitled to have.' Ultimately, the right of a federal petitioner to have his claims reviewed may be reduced to the right of
one independent review. Since Congress has provided for more
than one means of review for federal petitioners to insure the integrity of the trial process, one adequate review, either by criminal
appeal or by writ of certiorari, may ultimately be permitted to
preclude a duplicate review by motion to vacate.
'11 See generally, Wright & Sofaer, FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
The Allocation of Fact-findingResponsibility, 75 Yale L.J. 895 (1966), for a discus.
sion of administrative problems unique to habeas corpus for state petitioners.
,40394 U.S. at 226.
409 U.S. at 191.
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D. Extension of the Common Law Rule as Modified by Sanders
u. United States to Denials of Relief on Federal Criminal Appeal
Misstatement of the common law rule has also led to the conclusion that res judicata may not apply to denials of relief on
federal' criminal appeal. For the moment, the problems related
to issues that could or should have been adjudicated in the criminal process, but were not, are left aside. The sole concern here is
the power of the 2255 forum to relitigate issues already ruled upon
adversely to the petitioner in the criminal appellate process.
Section 2255 provides for discretion to refuse to relitigate issues already heard on a prior collateral petition,"' but the statute
is silent with respect to relitigation of issues already heard in the
criminal appellate process,' at least, there is no clear statutory
provision that permits finality prior to the collateral process by
"actual adjudication" on either the criminal appeal or certiorari to
the criminal appeal.
The circuits are split on whether res judicata may apply to
issues actually adjudicated on criminal appeal, barring them from
consideration on motion to vacate. Several cases indicate that res
judicata, in its strictest form, may not apply;' however, there are
"' Again, a distinction should be made between state and federal prisoners'
petitions. State criminal appellate judgments may not bar relitigation of federal
constitutional issues in the federal habeas process because there is a right to federal
adjudication of those claims, premised on the supremacy clause.
" "The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970). This was considered, in Sanders, to be the equivalent of § 2244 for state
prisoners, i.e., the statutory adoption of the Salinger rule.
"I Section 2255 reads in part that "[u]nless the motion and the files and
records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the
court shall ... grant a prompt hearing ... [to] determine the issues .... " 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
Arguably, where the appellate record indicates that an actual adjudication of
the issue raised by motion to vacate has already been made, the 2255 forum may
conclude that petitioner is entitled to no relief, i.e., res judicata. However, this
interpretation would be inconsistent with the interpretation given by the Supreme
Court to another subsection of 2255, which states that "[a] motion for such relief
may be made at any time." Id. In Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959),
five justices concurred that: "This latter provision simply means that, as in habeas
corpus, there is ... no resjudicata . ..."
Il Houston v. United States, 419 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1969); Bearden v. United
States, 403 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111 (1969); Floyd v.
United States, 365 F.2d 368, 379 (5th Cir. 1966).
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a number of decisions to the contrary.' 6 Among those courts that
assume the common law rule is applicable to denials of relief on
criminal appeal, most find some device to avoid complying with
the rule.' 7
While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the validity of
permitting actual adjudication on criminal appeal to operate as a
bar to relitigation on motion to vacate, a significant dictum of the
Supreme Court indicates that the common law rule as modified by
Sanders v. United States does govern this situation. 14 8 In Kaufman
v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that it "perceive[d]
no differences between the situations of state and federal prisoners
which should make [fact-finding] less subject to scrutiny by a §
2255 court."'' In a footnote to this observation, the Court went on
to say that:
Where a trial or appellate court has determined the federal
prisoner's claim, discretion may in a proper case be exercised
against the grant of a § 2255 hearing. Section 2255 provides for
hearing "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the
case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief
.

.

.

."

In Sanders v. United States, .

.

. we announced stan-

dards governing the determination whether a hearing should be
ordered in the case of a successive motion under § 2255. Similarly, where the trial or appellate court has had a "say" on a
federal prisoner's claim, it may be open to the § 2255 court to
determine that on the basis of the motion, files, and records,
"the prisoner is entitled to no relief."''
Thus, the ambiguous subsection of § 2255, which states that petitioner is entitled to a hearing "[u]nless the motion and the files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief," is given the same meaning as the subsection
permitting a discretionary bar to relitigation on successive motions.'5' Again, the meaning of "abuse of discretion" becomes probUnited States v. Barillas, 291 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1961), asserts that res judicata is inapplicable except as to issues actually adjudicated. Accord, Fiano v.
United States, 291 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1961); D'Ercole v. United States, 361 F.2d
211, 212 n.1 (2d Cir. 1966).
" Blackwell v. United States, 429 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1970); Houston v.
United States, 419 F.2d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1969); Bearden v. United States, 403 F.2d
782 (5th Cir. 1968).
"
See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
Id. at 227.

",

'5'

Id. at 227 n.8.
"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or succes-
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lematic. If it is always an abuse of discretion to relitigate the same
issues of law on the same facts as those considered by the appellate
court on the criminal appeal, 52 then the statute is simply construed to permit, euphemistically, the application of res judicata
or collateral estoppel. Such an interpretation would change substantially the notion of the purpose of habeas corpus, i.e., that the
collateral civil process exists to insure the integrity of the criminal
process'53 since it would permit review by criminal appeal to preclude an independent collateral review.
Furthermore, such an interpretation makes the initial provision of § 2255 unclear. That provision states, in pertinent part,
that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution. . . may move the court. . . to vacate ..
the sent.ence. 154
When may a prisoner "move the court . . .to vacate . . .the
sentence"? In attempting to answer this question, it should be
remembered that while there is no jurisdictional prerequisite
under § 2255 requiring federal petitioners to exhaust appellate
remedies prior to seeking collateral relief, it is the expected course
of action; 55 to ensure this course, district courts are empowered to
refuse to litigate issues collaterally that were intentionally not
raised at the criminal trial or on direct appeal. 5 ' As a result, a
petitioner is forced to appeal all issues known to him in order to
preserve them for collateral review. 57 But, once he has sought direct review, he may equally be precluded, by exercise of discretion
sive motion for similar relief. . .

."

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).

"I Itwas apparently not considered an abuse of discretion to do so in Salinger
v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
1
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 229 (1969). The Supreme Court
stated in Kaufman that the history of the writ "refutes a construction of the federal
courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts of
appellate review. The function on habeas is different. It is to test by way of an
original civil proceeding, independent of the normal channels of review of criminal
judgments, [the validity of the incarceration]." Id. at 223-24.
15'28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
'1 See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970)
requires exhaustion of state remedies for state prisoners prior to seeking habeas
corpus in the federal courts. Id. Section 2255 has no comparable provision.
"I Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8 (1969) (dictum).
'57

Id.
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or some other rule, from collaterally attacking those claims that

were litigated on the criminal appeal. 5 ' Thus, § 2255 becomes
inaccessible to federal prisoners except in a very limited number
of circumstances, e.g., where there is newly discovered evidence;
where incompetency of counsel is alleged; or where the 2255 forum
finds no deliberate bypass of the appellate process for issues not
previously litigated.
While the Supreme Court has been unable to see any significant differences between the remedies for state and federal prisoners, this distinction-that actual adjudication on criminal appeal
may bar relief collaterally for federal prisoners, implied in the
Kaunman footnote-demands a concession that § 2255 is a unique
remedy. Unlike common law habeas corpus (or the statutory habeas corpus for state prisoners), which operates as a check by one
independent court system upon another and inferior court system,
§ 2255 operate as a self-review, an examination by the 2255 forum
of its own previous conduct during the criminal proceeding.," More
important, the 2255 forum is an inferior court in the federal court
hierarchy. Thus, while any deference shown by a federal district
court towards a state court is based merely on comity' and not
on lack of power, the deference of a lower federal court to a higher
federal court, to which it is considered bound on prior rulings of
law, may be a limitation of power in the instance of entertaining a
motion to vacate on issues already heard by an appellate court,
preventing the lower court from ruling contrary to its superior.
Id.

, ' This presents problems of its own with regard to the level of objectivity that
can be achieved by self-review. One special feature of the motion to vacate requires
that the court hearing the motion be the same court that sentenced petitioner. 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). The word "court" has often been construed to mean "judge."
See Burris v. United States, 430 F.2d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
921 (1971) (and cases cited therein). The sentencing judge is very often the same
judge who tried and convicted petitioner. Thus, the independence of the collateral
civil process, which was a traditional aspect of habeas corpus, is jeopardized. The
requirement to relitigate and redetermine the facts under the Townsend standards,
e.g., where the facts are not supported by the record; or where the facts have not
been adequately developed; or where there is an appearance of lack of a full and
fair fact hearing, is weakened by permitting the same judge to evaluate the fairness
or completeness of his own trial work.
"I Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422
(1963), where the Court asserts that state adjudications bear no more weight before
a federal court than does a foreign judgment and that a state court simply cannot
have the last say on federal constitutional claims. Id.
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This may seem obvious, but it has not proved obvious in practice,
given the assumed applicability of the common law rule.
Because many lower federal courts express the opinion that
the common law rule is applicable to denials of relief on criminal
appeal (with respect to issues cognizable on motion to vacate),
these district and appellate courts have been hard put to avoid the
ridiculous circumstance of arguing among themselves as to which
court may finally grant or deny relief to a petitioner. Recall the
similar circumstance concerning successive petitions in the
Schnitzler case.'6 ' Of course, the use of stare decisis, in substitution
for res judicata, to avoid hierarchical chaos, is unique.'62 There are,
however, several commonly recurring rules that are used to bar

relitigation under similar circumstances.
The most common formula used is the McCann-Sunal rule 3
that "habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."'' This phrase as used by the Supreme Court has meant that
habeas corpus could not be used in lieu of the normal appellate
process to raise claims of trial error that are cognizable only by
criminal appeal.'65 Moreover, use of this rule as a substitute for res
judicata to bar constitutional issues that could or should have been
raised on the criminal appeal, but were not, has been condemned
by the Supreme Court.'6 The validity of its use as a substitute for
406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969). See discussion pp. 17-18 supra.
,62
Another unique device is the application of the doctrine of law of the case.
In Fiano v. United States, 291 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1961), the court acknowledged that
were the indictment so defective as to be void, which the petitioner had alleged,
the issue of sufficiency of the indictment could be heard on motion to vacate.
Nonetheless, the court asserted that the issue had been "unsuccessfully raised...
on [petitioner's] appeal, and . .. [was] now res adjudicata and the law of the
case." Id. at 114.
'1 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947). Neither case involved issues that were ruled upon on
direct appeal in the normal criminal appellate process; rather, they involved, respectively, application for the writ while the criminal appeal was pending and
waiver of criminal appeal altogether. The Supreme Court has never considered the
use of this rule to preclude a subsequent collateral review following exhaustion of
criminal appellate remedies. Therefore, any use of this rule to bar issues that were
appealed, instead of waived, is an extension of and a misapplication of the rule.
664 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947).
IC Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223 n.7 (1969). But cf. Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), where the Court held that an issue of trial error,
which was preserved by raising it on appeal, may be brought by habeas or motion
to vacate where there has been an intervening change of law affecting that issue.
"I See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223 (1969).
"'
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res judicata to bar constitutional issues actually litigated on the
criminal appeal has not yet been considered by the Supreme
Court. But such use avoids the very end that habeas corpus, as
traditionally understood, seeks to achieve: opportunity for a civil
review, independent of the criminal process, in order to insure the
integrity of the criminal process.' 7
A second method by which lower federal courts bar collateral
review of the criminal process is to exercise discretion to bar the
petition,'68 or to apply the Sanders rule.' 2 Exercise of discretion,
likewise, changes significantly the traditional structure of the writ
of habeas corpus, for traditionally, where one alleged good cause
for issuance of the writ, it had to be issued.' 0 No discretion was
,17In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963), the Supreme Court distinguished the habeas function from the appellate function, saying:
The whole history of the writ ... refutes a construction of the federal
courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of
courts of appellate review. The function on habeas is different. It is to test
by way of an original civil proceeding, independent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments, the very gravest allegations ....
The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this
Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus
is plenary. Therefore, where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus
alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal court
to which the application is made has the power to receive evidence and
try the facts anew.
This distinction was reiterated in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223.24
(1969), in connection with the power of 2255 courts.
I" See Blackwell v. United States, 429 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970); Bearden v.
United States, 403 F.2d 782, 784 (5th Cir. 1968); cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111 (1969);
Baca v. United States, 383 F.2d 154, 156 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Thompson, 261 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.
1958).
' See Baca v. United States, 383 F.2d 154, 156 (10th Cir. 1967).
110All the great prerogative writs of the common law were considered discretionary in the sense that there was no absolute right to their issuance, but that a
strong showing of entitlement was required. Nevertheless, in the law of habeas
corpus, once such a showing was made, there was no discretion to refuse the writ.
Blackstone wrote:
[I]f a probable ground be shewn, that the party is imprisoned without
just cause, and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas
corpus is then a writ of right, which "may not be denied, but ought to be
granted to every man that is committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of the king, the privy
council, or any other."
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, in SOKOL, supra note 2, at 323.
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permitted.'7 ' In order to apply a discretionary bar, in conformity
with the writ's tradition, the court must first determine that no
good cause exists for the writ's issuance. This determination requires definition of the term "good cause." If the ambiguous
subsection to § 2255-that a hearing must be granted "[u]nless
the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief"-is construed to include
a ruling adverse to petitioner on the criminal appeal, then of course
the writ can be barred, not on the basis of res judicata, but on the
basis of no allegation of good cause for its issuance. But this would
simply be a subterfuge for res judicata. More properly, "good
cause" means an alleged violation of constitutional rights or lack
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the district court must determine
whether to hear a petition that asserts good cause even in the face
of an adverse ruling on that issue on criminal appeal. This use of
discretion does not resolve the problem of lower courts hearing and
overruling judgments of higher courts; it merely gives the lower
court an opportunity to avoid the administrative problems involved.
A third method by which lower federal courts bar a first collateral review of issues heard on the criminal appeal is to label the
17
collateral review derogatorily as "purposeless duplication""
or as
' 3
"frivolous.'
Frivolousness usually implies that the case is so
lacking in substance that it should be dismissed. 4 However, when
asserted as a bar to a first motion to vacate after the criminal
appeal, the term seems to be equated with the mere fact that
petitioner has already litigated the same issue in the criminal appellate process.' Again, if this fact alone triggers the bar, then it
is nothing more than subterfuge for res judicata.
None of the foregoing rules, with the exception of the discretionary rule, conforms to the supposedly correct rule that res judi"I Id. See also Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. Rev. 64, 74-76
(1902).
,72
Blackwell v. United States, 429 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1970).
'7' Fuentes v. United States, 455 F.2d 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v.
United
States, 420 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1970); Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st
Cir. 1967); Lipscomb v. United States, 312 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 1963).
,7,
Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741, 742 (9th Cir. 1965).
"' See, e.g., Dining v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir. 1967), where
the First Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that: "Indeed, an appeal from the denial
of a § 2255 motion which attempts to raise again questions which had been previously determined may be dismissed as frivolous."
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cata may not apply to habeas corpus, except that each avoids using
the term "res judicata." Use of these rules indicates that a problem
of orderly court administration does exist and that the common
law rule performs unsatisfactorily in this situation. Moreover,
these rules present a serious problem of their own: they are applied
inconsistently and arbitrarily. Most exemplary of this inconsistency and consequent arbitrariness is the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals presents a kaleidoscopic
line of cases, indicating an open split among the panels as to
whether the common law rule is to be applied strictly or not. Until
1961, the court had espoused the McCann-Sunal rule,' both in
context' 7 and out.' Suddenly, in 1961, the court swung to the
common law rule, holding that issues previously determined either
on direct appeal or on motion to vacate could be relitigated since
res judicata was inapplicable."'
In 1965, the court reverted to its former rule that motions
presenting no issues other than those already considered on direct
appeal are not reviewable a second time.'80 Likewise, in 1966, the
court dismissed an issue, though cognizable under § 2255, because
it had already been reviewed in the normal appellate process.' 8'
More recently, in Floyd v. United States ,,"' the court turned again
to the common law rule with all its obvious consequences:
Remembering always that principles of res judicata, as such,
are not a part of habeas-like post-conviction remedies, so that
an earlier ruling does not foreclose reconsideration or even a
change of result, the Constitution does not require ... another
evidentiary hearing . . . on facts already fully developed
183

,T' See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947), where the court asserted that "habeas corpus will
not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
' See Larson v. United States, 275 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1960), which applied the
McCann-Sunal rule to bar trial errors from collateral review.
I's See Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1959), which applied the
McCann-Sunalrule to bar constitutional issues from collateral review.
,' Birchfield v. United States, 296 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1961).
' Del Genio v. United States, 352 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1965).
"'
Grene v. United States, 360 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1966).
' 365 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1966).
's Id. at 379.
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This rule was reconfirmed by a different panel,' 84 which relied on

the Supreme Court dictum in Heflin v. United States' 85 where five

justices concurred that:
The words which Congress has used are not ambiguous. Section
2255 provides further that: . . . "A motion for such relief may

be made at any time." This latter provision simply means that,
as in habeas corpus, there is no statute of limitations, no res
judicata, and that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable.'86
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a limiting provision of "judicial discretion,""'8 permitting the 2255 forum
to determine whether to relitigate.
One year later, in Houston v. United States,'l the court back-

pedaled to state that "the principles of res judicata do not automatically apply to § 2255 motions

.

.

[but] there is likewise no

requirement that hearings be held on issues already laid to rest,"' 8
citing the Floyd case.'

This fitful volley has resumed in the most recent cases of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals where the court has held that issues
alleged collaterally that have been previously determined on direct
appeal are precluded from reconsideration as "purposeless dupli9
cation"'"' and as "frivolous.'

8

2

Use of these rules is not consistent with the common law rule
as modified by Sanders and as applied by the Supreme Court.
Therefore, assuming the common law rule is applicable to denials
of relief on criminal appeal, application of these rules of preclusion,
with the exception of the discretionary rule, is impermissible. Yet,
the very existence of these preclusionary rules demonstrates that
"

See Bearden v. United States, 403 F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1968).

'= 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959).
'

Id. at 420.

Bearden v. United States, 403 F.2d 782, 784 (5th Cir. 1968).
419 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1969).
282 Id. at 32. This is simply a non sequitur.
"® The court's reliance on the language of Floyd to support its proposition is
unwarranted. The crux of the confusion is (1) whether a prior full scale hearing that
fully developed the facts permits foreclosure of a second hearing to develop the
same facts, or (2) whether the ruling of law on the facts developed at the prior
hearing permits foreclosure of a reconsideration of the prior ruling of law. Floyd
seems to say the former; Houston, the latter.
il, Blackwell v. United States, 429 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1970).
in Fuentes v. United States, 455 F.2d 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1972).
"
"

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975

37

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 78

the lower federal courts have had to wrestle with the problem
asserted in the introduction, i.e., that extension of the common law
rule to denials of relief on criminal appeal would permit lower
federal courts to ignore or to overrule prior decisions of higher
federal courts with a consequent chaos within the federal courts
and the creation of an enormous number of inconclusive criminal
judgments.
The questions raised by these cases, and the preclusionary
rules asserted in them, ultimately concern the legitimate functions
of the criminal appeal and motion to vacate, and the scope of the
2255 forum's power to relitigate issues that have been ruled upon
by a higher court in the federal criminal process. Does motion to
vacate really serve as a second appeal as some of these courts
suggest, or does it serve a distinct and independent function: to
insure the integrity of the federal criminal process? If it is serving
an independent function, is the district court empowered to insure
the integrity of the appellate court? Does the district court, by
virtue of its 2255 jurisdiction and the common law rule, have power
to overrule its superior court?
As can be seen from these cases, there is a need for the Supreme Court or Congress to provide some clear rule to resolve the
confusion of whether the common law rule applies to denials of
relief on criminal appeal or some other rule foreclosing relitigation
of those issues ruled upon in the criminal appellate process. Furthermore, there is a need to clarify the Sanders rule, which was
created for successive petitions. The Supreme Court should determine whether this rule is applicable to successive petitions where
there has been an intervening appeal ruling on the issues raised
subsequently, and whether it is applicable to collateral review of
issues heard on the criminal appeal, as suggested by the Kaufman
footnote. If it is applicable, then the district court has, within its
discretion, power to overrule its own court of appeals. And the right
of respondent to appeal, which thereby permits the court of appeals to reverse the district court, is no practical solution to the
lower court's ability to rule contrary to its own court of appeals.
This simply permits a wasteful and time-consuming power struggle.
E. Extension of the Common Law Rule as Modified by Sanders
and Fay to Issues That Could or Should Have Been Adjudicated
in the Federal Criminal Process, But Were Not; and Its Subsequent Limitation
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1. The Right to a Plenary Hearing
Section 2255 provides that "[a] prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the
right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States...
may move the court .

to vacate

. . .

the sentence.""' Though

this language seems clear, the circuit courts had been split over the
question of whether all constitutional issues could be challenged
by motion to vacate," 4 necessitating a review by the Supreme
Court to resolve the issue. In Kaufman 9' the Supreme Court held
that an issue of illegal search and seizure may not be barred on
motion to vacate'96 since the statutory remedy is intended to be as
broad as habeas corpus 97 and since the statute of 1867, which
expanded the issues cognizable on habeas corpus to include constitutional claims,'98 is applicable to both state and federal prisoners. 11 However, the Court recognized that circumstances may exist
that would permit the 2255 forum, under equitable principles, to
refuse to litigate issues, otherwise cognizable on motion to vacate,
that were not raised timely in the criminal process. 0'
The concern, in this section, is with those conditions that may
entitle a court to bar issues collaterally (where the criminal judgment was entered by a court of competent jurisdiction)"0 ' on the
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See note 5, supra.
"I See, e.g., cases cited in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 n.3,
221 n.4 (1969).
It 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
"' Id. at 231.
"' Id. at 221-22.
"' Id.
at 221.
29 Id.
This argument was not necessary since 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) provides
specifically that federal prisoners may bring constitutional claims by motion to
vacate.
20 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 n.3, 227 n.8 (1969).
201 Formerly, the writ of habeas corpus issued only for the purpose of inquiring
into the jurisdictional authority of a court (or other governmental agency) to order
a person detained. The writ would not issue against a detention ordered by a court
of competent jurisdiction. See Ex parteWatkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830).
Any judgment entered or commitment ordered had to be more than erroneous or
improper; it had to be null and void in order for the writ to issue. Id. at 203.
This concept of nullity is essential to any consideration of barring issues, otherwise cognizable on habeas corpus, simply because they could have beeh challenged
in the criminal process, but were not. Since lack of subject matter jurisdiction
always makes a judgment void and subject to challenge, see F. JAMES, JR., supra
note 1, § 11.6 at 534-40, it is not crucial that this issue be raised in the criminal
13
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basis that an orderly challenge was not made at the appropriate
time in the criminal process to the issues raised collaterally. The
problems suggested here, concerning finality, are not whether relitigation is necessary, but whether one adequate litigation has, in
fact, been afforded; and whether the courts should be obligated to
provide an alternate means of litigation where the ordinary means
available to petitioner was not exercised;"' or whether the courts
may be permitted to refuse the alternate means; and if so, upon
what principle or principles of finality.
a.

The Common Law Rule

The common law rule has been used by the Supreme Court
as justification for litigation of issues collaterally that were not
raised timely in the state criminal process. As previously indicated, the Supreme Court misstated and therefore misapplied the
common law rule in this situation." 3 In Fay v. Noia,0 4 the Supreme
Court held that the federal district court's habeas jurisdiction is
not limited by the failure of a state court defendant to seek direct
review in the state courts on an alleged violation of the fourteenth
amendment.0 5 Any weight to be given state adjudications is based
on comity and not on any doctrinal bar such as res judicata.06
process in order to preserve it for a subsequent collateral attack. Bowen v. Johnston,
306 U.S. 19 (1939). The argument of nullity runs aground, however, where the
subject matter competency of the habeas forum is expanded to include issues other
than jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has already abandoned the attempt to determine which challenges, other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction, may make a
judgment null and void. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See also Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas
Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1055-62 (1970), for a discussion of these cases.
Rather, the Court has conceded that deprevation of constitutional rights, by courts
of competent jurisdiction, may be challenged by habeas corpus. See Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 222 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963).
20 Since most constitutional issues may conceivably be raised at one or more
stages of the criminal process prior to any application for collateral review, it
becomes legitimate to require petitioners to preserve these constitutional issues by
asserting them at every possible opportunity. To administer this requirement effectively, however, the courts must necessarily be thrown back into the quagmire of
determining which issues other than subject matter jurisdiction may render a judgment void, or if not void, then so lacking in due process that failure to raise the
claim in the criminal process should not bar that claim collaterally.
See discussion pp. 21-22, supra.
20 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
205

Id. at 429-30.

204Id. at 420.
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Even though the common law rule may be rejected as a valid
reason for refusal to give finality to state criminal judgments, other
valid policy reasons do exist for this refusal, such as the need to
achieve uniformity of federal law," 7 or to correct inadequacies of
state fact-finding procedures."' These reasons, necessarily, do not
apply to federal criminal judgments. Nevertheless, with respect to
motions to vacate for federal prisoners, the Supreme Court has
considered the holdings in Fay to be applicable2 11 so that "failure
to take a direct appeal from conviction does not deprive a federal
post-conviction court of power to adjudicate the merits of constitutional claims .... "1210
In Kaufman, the Supreme Court applied the common law rule
sub silentio, quoting from Fay that "conventional notions of finality . . . cannot be permitted to defeat the. . . policy that federal
constitutional rights . . . shall not be denied without. . . oppor-

tunity for plenary federal judicial review." ' Likewise, the common law rule was impliedly extended by analogy from the successive petitions doctrine, espoused in Sanders. The Court, quoting
from Sanders, continued that "[c]onventional notions of finality
of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and
infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.

212

The Court con-

cluded that "the interest in finality" is plainly the same "with
2 12
regard to both federal and state prisoners.

All these assertions have already been criticized. Nevertheless, there are valid reasons for refusal to grant finality to federal
criminal judgments, and instead, to require the 2255 forum to
litigate claims not previously litigated.
b.

Manifest Federal Policy
One reason is the claimed "manifest federal policy"2 ' against
denying constitutional rights without "the fullest opportunity for
plenary federal judicial review.
2I

' 218

The Supreme Court has, until

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 n.3, 228 (1969).

210 Townsend
20

2,0 Id. at 220 n.3.
",

Id. at 228.

Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
212
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recently, taken the position that "full protection of. . .constitutional rights"21 requires more than an opportunity to be heard in
a federal forum; full protection requires "full and fair considera'
tion of constitutional claims."217
Under this policy, habeas or 2255
review may not be denied solely on the ground that the issue
should have been raised in the criminal trial or on appeal, but was
not.
c.

An Independent Cause of Action

Traditionally, habeas corpus was considered to be a different
cause of action from the criminal action that resulted in the prior
judgment." ' Thus, it has been said that habeas corpus is a civil
remedy "sued out by one arrested for crime . . .[and] brought
. . .to assert the civil right of personal liberty ... ,,
"I The writ
was therefore not considered to be a continuing proceeding in the
criminal prosecution, but an independent civil proceeding."' Further, "the judicial proceeding under [habeas corpus was] not to
inquire into the criminal act which [was] -complained of, but into
22
the right to liberty notwithstanding the act. '
In Fay, the Supreme Court's lack of power to grant relief on
direct review by certiorari, due to an adequate and independent
state law ground, was neither a logical nor a legal bar to the lower
federal court's power to grant relief by habeas corpus.2 This result
was based, in part, upon the "independent" nature of the collateral remedy.2 The Court reasoned by analogy that "Noia's failure
to appeal [would not] have precluded him from bringing an action under the Civil Rights Act .... ,224 Similarly, since habeas
corpus is an independent remedy, it is irrelevant to its exercise that
certain bars exist within the criminal system to any challenges
attempted within that system.225 The inapplicability of the adequate state ground rule to habeas corpus was also based upon the
216

Id.

217 Id.

supra note 2, § 2.
Kurtz v. Moffit, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885).
2" Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923).
221 Ex parte Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883). See also Eagles v. United States
ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 315 (1946).
211 SOKOL,
219

22 372 U.S. at 429-30.
2 Id.
224Id.
225 Id.

at 422.

at 428.
at 426.
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distinction drawn between the appellate process and the habeas
process,"' and the fact that "the adequate state-ground rule is a
2
function of the limitations of appellate review" only.1
The Supreme Court has treated both habeas corpus and motion to vacate as independent civil remedies to test the validity of
the criminal trial process.2 2 If this analysis is to be maintained for
purposes of applying some doctrinal bar to collateral litigation,
then res judicata would not apply to issues that could or should
have been litigated in the criminal process, but were not, even
though the common law rule is not applicable, since res judicata
does not apply to different causes of action.2 29 The proper principle
of finality would be collateral estoppel, which would only bar issues actually litigated previously.o
On the other hand, while one may argue that the causes of
action are technically different, and even that the cause of action
for habeas corpus or motion to vacate does not arise until there has
been a judgment rendered wrongfully in the prior cause of action,
the issues and arguments of both causes of action often overlap.
Indeed, the functions to be served by pre-trial motions, post-trial
motions, criminal appeal, and habeas corpus or motion to vacate
often overlap. Thus, where a petitioner could easily have pursued
those issues and theories in the first cause of action, should he not
22 Id. at 429-30.
22 Id. at 429.
22 Townsend v.

Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963) (habeas corpus); Kaufman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223-26 (1969) (motion to vacate).
" F. JAMES, JR., supra note 11, § 11.18 at 575. Analysis of § 2255 proceedings
is difficult because § 2255 is a hybrid of remedies. It combines the common law writ
of error coram nobis or the statutory motion to vacate judgment with the common
law writ of habeas corpus. The former two remedies were traditionally considered
to be direct attacks on the criminal judgment, or a continuation of the original
criminal proceeding in the same sense as direct appeal is a continuation of the
original proceeding; whereas, habeas corpus was traditionally viewed as an independent civil proceeding that challenged the validity of the incarceration, irrespective of the first cause of action that established guilt for a criminal act.
If § 2255 is considered to be more nearly analogous to the writ of error coram
nobis or motion to vacate, and thus, to permit res judicata to apply to motions to
vacate under § 2255, though that doctrine would not be applicable to habeas corpus
as an independent cause of action, then the Court has come full circle to the
problems raised in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). If the statutory
motion to vacate narrows the scope of petitioner's remedies, which he had prior to
the adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), then the statute presents serious constitutional problems with regard to suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
21 F. JAMES, JR., supra note 11, at 575-76.
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be compelled to do so? This requirement is most logical, but it does
not resolve the problem under consideration here; it creates the
problem. If petitioner is required to pursue his claims as soon as
they arise and as soon as a mechanism is available by which to
raise them, and yet he fails to do so, should he then be precluded
from pursuing those issues later? This is most difficult to answer,
especially when the issue of finality must be weighed against the
prospect of loss of life or liberty. In fact, this was the consideration
given for requiring relitigation of successive similar petitions in
Sanders."' The distinguishing point to be made, however, is that
it is less essential to relitigate the same claims than it is to litigate
an essential claim for the first time. Discretion to bar litigation of
new claims, where no plenary hearing has ever been afforded to the
issues raised untimely, should be exercised more sparingly than
the exercise of such a bar to issues already once adjudicated. Moreover, collateral litigation of a claim never before litigated does not
pose the administrative problems suggested earlier with regard to
lower courts reviewing actual adjudications of their superior
courts. The only major policy breached by such belated litigation
is that against petitioners splitting their causes of action, which
constitutes harassment of the courts and causes undue delay. This
breach may be avoided, however, by application of equitable principles to bar those persons found to be intentionally splitting their
claims, harassing the courts, and causing undue delays. 32
d. The Statutory Language
Section 2255 provides that "[a] motion [to vacate] may be
made at any time."' This provision has been interpreted to mean
that, as in habeas corpus, res judicata has no application.134
Arguably, the common law rule has been codified and must
govern motions to vacate even if it is otherwise not constitutionally
required and even though its application no longer makes sense.
However, if res judicata is inapplicable to issues litigated collaterally that were not litigated in the criminal process because these
two proceedings constitute different causes of action, then the
foregoing interpretation of the statute can only be taken to apply
373 U.S. at 8.

For other arguments, see Cleary, Res JudicataReexamined, 57 Yale L.J. 339

(1948).
''

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See supra note 5.
See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959).
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to successive similar petitions, i.e., to the same cause of action

sued on more than once, and not to an issue raised for the first time
in a collateral proceeding. It may thus be concluded that the statute is silent with respect to a first motion to vacate brought after
the criminal process and that had Congress intended to bar or limit
such issues, it would have said so, as it did with respect to successive petitions,"' when it codified the Salinger rule. 3 '
2.

Limitations on Plenary Hearing
a. Equitable Principles

Though there is a tradition of liberality of relitigation in the
law of habeas corpus, there are some limitations on that liberality.
One limitation has been to bar claims by application of equitable
principles. 37 Thus, petitioners have not been permitted to abuse
the orderly procedures provided them for correction of constitutional violations. 38 As mentioned before, one may be barred by a
finding of petitioner's "lack of good faith,"" 9 or "abuse of the remedy," 4 or "deliberate by-pass"24' of the normal methods of correcting constitutional errors in the criminal process. Each of these
represents the imposition of an equitable concept to bar collateral
litigation.
b. Express Waiver
More recently, the Supreme Court has applied an express
waiver provision, contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to bar collateral review. In Davis v. United States,24 petitioner attempted, on motion to vacate, to challenge for the first
time the grand jury array, from which the grand jury that indicted
him was selected, on the ground of racial discrimination in its
- 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) provides, in part, that "[tihe sentencing court shall
not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf
of the same prisoner."
21 This statutory provision was construed to be a codification of the Salinger
rule. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12 (1963).
21 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 n.3 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963).
- Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) (dictum).
'' Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924).
240

Id.

2"

Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 220 n.3, 227 n.8 (1969); Fay v.

Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
242

411 U.S. 233 (1973).
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composition, 243 though this specific issue was required to be raised
by pre-trial motion pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(2).1" Rule
12(b)(2) provides that "defenses and objections based on defects
in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information. . . may be raised only by motion before trial. . . . Failure to present any such defense or objection . . . constitutes a
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
the waiver."
Davis, unaided by counsel, alleged that he had neither waived
nor abandoned his right to challenge the array.4 The district judge
dismissed the petition on the basis of the waiver provision in rule
12(b)(2) and on a finding that no cause was shown for avoidance
of the waiver," 6 though petitioner was given no opportunity to offer
any proof in support of the allegation that he had not waived the

issue 247
24
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 1

In the Supreme Court, petitioner argued that his case was
controlled by Kaufman and Sanders and that he could not be
precluded from raising the issue unless he had "deliberately bypassed" the criminal process or had "understandingly and knowingly" waived the claim.4 9
2
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition,
distinguishing Kaufman on two grounds: (1) that petitioner in
Kaufman had timely raised the issue of illegal search and seizure
at trial, but had then failed to raise the issue on appeal; whereas,
petitioner in Davis had never raised the issue of jury discrimination prior to the collateral process;25 ' and (2) that Kaufman involved an interpretation of § 2255 in the absence of an express
waiver requirement in the statute or the applicable rule of criminal
procedure, 41(e); whereas, Davis involved application of an express
213Id.
'"

at 235.

Id. at 236.

24

Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting opinion).

','

Id. at 235-6.

247Id. at 235.
248 Davis v. United

States, 455 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd 411 U.S. 233

(1973).
243 411 U.S. at 236.
"

Id. at 245.
Id. at 239-40.
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waiver provision set forth in 12(b)(2).211 The minority suggested
3
that these were not valid distinctions.3
Is there any essential difference between failure to raise an
issue on appeal that may not bar collateral review, and failure to
raise an issue at trial or pre-trial that may bar collateral review?
This depends on the rationale given for the difference. Kaufman
is limited by this distinction to the holding that issues not raised
on criminal appeal may not be barred in the 2255 process because
the common law rule does not permit such a bar; because there is
a manifest federal policy that there be a federal plenary hearing
on federal constitutional claims; and because "adequate protection of constitutional rights. . . requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief.' 254 None of these reasons was expressly rejected as rationale for the permissive litigation policy,
espoused in Kaufman. Why are they not equally applicable to the
Davis case? Can it be that the common law rule, or a manifest
federal policy, or the independence of the collateral remedy, requires federal review of constitutional claims in the one case, but
not in the other, merely on the distinction that the process of
criminal review was aborted at a different stage in each case?
Apparently so.
Does it really matter that Kaufman dealt with illegal search
and seizure and the requirement of pre-trial challenge under rule
41(e), which has no express waiver provision, and that Davis dealt
with challenge to the array and the requirement of pre-trial challenge under rule 12(b) (2), which does have an express waiver provision? The minority opinion urged that rule 41(e) also has an express waiver provision, developed by case law, and that no essential difference exists, for purposes of a bar, between an express
waiver provision contained in a rule and one developed by case
2
law .Even if there are valid distinctions between Kaufman and
Davis, the Supreme Court's refusal to alter the district court's
findings in Davis raises a more disturbing point. The 2255 forum
211 Id.

at 240.
Id. at 248-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting opinion).
2m Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969).
m The majority avoided this issue by noting that the waiver provision of rule
41(e) was not considered by the Court in Kaufman since petitioner had objected
timely to the introduction of evidence in the criminal trial, and simply failed to
renew the issue on appeal. Id. at 239-40.
2
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was simply permitted to presume, from a record that was not concerned with the issue belatedly raised, that petitioner was. not
prejudiced by the violation of his constitutional right, and that he
had no valid excuse for failure to raise the claim timely."' The e
findings were irrebuttable since petitioner was not entitled to offer
proof to the contrary. This irrebuttable presumption is simply subterfuge for res judicata.
What was wrong with the standard of deliberate bypass, or
why would the Supreme Court in Davis not permit the presumption of waiver to be rebutted? The answer lies in the political
reality of a Court reconstituted from the time of the decisions in
Fay, Townsend, Sanders, and Kaufman. This Court's philosophical attitude toward habeas corpus has been expounded in the recent decision of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,? where Mr. Justice
Powell, concurring, and with whom the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Rhenquist joined, concurring, stated:
Recent decisions . . . have tended to depreciate the importance of finality of prior judgments in criminal cases.
[Citing Kaufman, Sanders and Fay.] This trend may be a
justifiable evolution of the use of habeas corpus where one in
state custody raises a constitutional claim bearing on his innocence. But the justification . . . is measurably less apparent in
the typical Fourth Amendment claim asserted on collateral attack. In this latter case, a convicted defendant is most often
asking society to redetermine a matter with no bearing at all on
the basic justice of his incarceration.m
Likewise, in Davis, a challenge to the grand jury array was
viewed as having no bearing on the justice of petitioner's incarceration." 9 Both of these cases imply that one must allege innocence
to be entitled to challenge the incarceration.26 ' The right to challenge detention based upon one's innocence substantially changes
the concept of habeas corpus. Moreover, if carried further, this
argument supports the notion that if one is clearly guilty, there is
no need for a fair trial or any trial at all, or if entitled to this, but
Id. at 237-38.
- 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
258 Id. at 256 (concurring opinion).
2' "The government's case against petitioner was, although largely circumstantial, a strong one." 411 U.S. at 244.
2 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973); accord, Kaufman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 232-36 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
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denied it, no writ of habeas corpus would issue since the lack of
due process may be counter-balanced by petitioner's obvious guilt.
The final disturbing note with regard to Davis concerns the
Supreme Court's lack of any concomitant vigor in enforcing the
waiver exception for "cause shown" under rule 12(b)(2) as was
demonstrated in enforcing the waiver provision itself. Does not a
determination of the right to relief from the waiver require an
investigation by the 2255 forum of whether good cause existed for
the failure to raise the claim timely? Such an investigation should,
minimally, require a hearing, permitting petitioner to present evidence tending to show good cause for the failure to raise the claim
timely. It makes no sense to permit the district court to presume
that good cause cannot be demonstrated. Moreover, it makes no
sense to apply good cause as a standard to determine justification
for failure to raise an issue timely, if lack of knowledge of the issue
or lack of intent to waive the issue may not be considered good
cause. "Good cause" has, then, no rational meaning.
Unfortunately, the Court chose to apply a principle of finality
without discussing all the issues raised by the waiver, i.e., the
implied rejection of the common law rule; the implied rejection of
a manifest federal policy against such foreclosure; and more important, the implied rejection of a concept with considerable tradition: the notion that habeas corpus and motion to vacate are independent remedies and, therefore, do not stand or fall on any contingencies of the criminal process, but rest upon equitable principles that may be interposed to deny relief.
F. Is the Common Law grule Constitutionally Required?
There are two premises, suggested by the Supreme Court,
from which the conclusion that the common law rule is constitutionally required may be deduced: (1) that "[t]he inapplicability
of res judicata to habeas [or 2255]

. .

.is inherent in the very role

and function of the writ";281 and (2) that the application of res
judicata to the writ would raise "serious constitutional ques' with regard
tions"262
to suspension of the writ." 3
Notably, both these premises were suggested by a Supreme
Court of the early 1960's, a Court that has been severely criticized
211Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
122

Id. at 11-12.

28

Id. at 13.
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for creating legal history to suit its purposes." 4 Moreover, both
premises, set forth in Sanders,6 ' relied on Fay26 the most seriously
criticized opinion of the early 1960's for its weak historical analysis
of the writ of habeas corpus. Equally, these two premises suffer
from limited historical support.
The Supreme Court had never noticed, until Sanders, that the
common law rule was inherent in the nature of the writ."7 The
Court in Fay did not rely on any inherent quality of the writ to
support the common law rule. Rather, it relied on the assertion in
Brown v. Allen that "[t]he State court cannot have the last say
when it . . . may have misconceived a federal constitutional
right." 6 The Brown rule was defended in Fay on the basis of the
"classic English practice," 6 ' which was a clear misstatement and
misapplication of that practiceY ° Finally, the common law rule in
Fay was considered to be "but an instance of the larger principle
that void judgments may be. . .impeached." 211 Thus, in the short
period of a month and a half from its decision in Fay, the Court in
Sanders discovered the "deeper roots" ' of the common law rule.
The premise that the common law rule is inherent in the writ
was based upon no authority; rather, it derived from syllogistic
argument. From the assertion in Fay that "government must al2 73
ways be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment,
the Court in Sanders concluded that "access to the courts...
must not be. . .impeded"' 4 by res judicata. From this, the Court
further concluded that "the inapplicability of res judicata to habeas [corpus] . . .is inherent in the very role and function of the
writ. ' 2715 The first conclusion drawn in Sanders is based on an in28 See, e.g., Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as
Legal Historian, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court-HabeasCorpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1966).

2-

373 U.S. 1 (1963).

"1 372

U.S. 391 (1963).
A general intimation may be found in Fay that "full common law scope"
should be accorded the writ and that refusal to do so might be construed as a
suspension. But the Court refused to consider the issue. 372 U.S. at 406.
26 Id. at 422; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1952) (concurring opinion).
28

25

372 U.S. at 422-23.

270 See

discussion pp. 21-22 supra.
372 U.S. at 423.

27

373 U.S. at 8.

2'

372 U.S. at 402.
373 U.S. at 8.

v5 Id.
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terpretive abuse of the word "always" as used in Fay. The assertion in Fay that "government must always be accountable" was
based on the assumption that accountability could be demonstrated by a showing that the imprisonment "conform[ed] with
the fundamental requirements of law;" ' no logic compels the conclusion that a showing of accountability can never be accomplished. That one must always be accountable is not the equivalent of saying that one must make a continuous accounting. It is
more sensible to interpret the phrase to mean that if one is called
upon, at any particular time, to render an accounting, one be
prepared to demonstrate the validity of the particular incarceration.
Finally, few characteristics can be said to be inherent in the
writ of habeas corpus, for, of this writ, little has remained constant. 7' Not even the procedure that gave the writ its name is
essential to effect the majority of challenges permitted by the writ
today. 5 Certainly, the definition of what constitutes illegal detention has not remained constant. Furthermore, the creators of
both the writ and the common law rule, the English, have never
considered the rule to be inherent in the writ. To them, it was
simply an archaic procedure of uncertain origin and rationale, the
28
function of which died when the English courts were reorganized.
The second premise that either § 2244 or § 2255 might raise
serious constitutional questions were they construed to derogate
from the "traditional liberality" 1 of the writ of habeas corpus
refers the reader to the brief historical analysis of the common law
rule discussed earlier in Sanders,2 ' and to Fay.2 The Court in Fay
asserted that "the Constitution invites, if it does not compel...
a generous construction of the power of the federal courts to dispense the writ conformably with common law practice. ' '21 But this

argument does not lead to the necessary conclusion that the common law rule is required by the mandate against suspension, as the
2

372 U.S. at 402.

I" See Cohen, supra note 3; Jenks, supra note 3.
21 See U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See note 5 supra.
"I Compare Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) with Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) and Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
2
See discussion pp. 9-11 supra.
2 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,11-12 (1963).
2n Id. at 7-8.
2"

372 U.S. at 406.

2Id.
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Court implied in Sanders. On the contrary, the mandate against
suspension was clearly rooted in a different historical problem, and
its resolution, from that of the common law rule. In England, the
fear of arbitrary imprisonment by the king, compounded by the
arbitrary suspension of habeas corpus or the dilatoriness of the
executive in making returns on the writ, led to the passage of the
Petition of Right in 1628 and the Habeas Corpus Act in 167 9.m To
ensure that any power of suspension would not fall into the hands
of the executive, Parliament claimed for itself the limited powers
of suspension. 86 Likewise, the major political battles and court
litigation in the United States, concerning the suspension of habeas corpus, have revolved around the issue of who had the power
of suspension, rather than the meaning of suspension itself."' 7
There is no suggestion in these historical, constitutional controversies that application of the doctrine of res judicata would have
been an unwarranted suspension of the writ, or, indeed, a suspension at all.
Finally, the origin and rationale of the common law rule are
so tenuous that any expression, without citation of authority, either that the common law rule is inherent in the writ, or that
application of res judicata would be an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, is dubious at best.
Of course, the Supreme Court is at liberty to construe the
Constitution to include the common law rule, as a matter of constitutional development, without citation of authority. But the Court
is then under some obligation to demonstrate the necessity of such
a construction. The Court did suggest that the rule was necessitated because "life or liberty [was] at stake." ' Yet, the Court did
not explain why more than one accounting for any specific constitutional challenge to the incarceration should be required. If one
determination of an issue cannot finally establish the legitimacy
of the incarceration with respect to the issue challenged, then the
incarcerated person cannot be presumed to be lawfully detained.
He must either be presumed to be unlawfully detained or in limbo,
somewhere between lawful and unlawful detention, while the
courts sit to hear the continuous accountings rendered ad infinitum by their jailors.
SOKOL,

supra note 2, at 3-15.

211Id. at 197.
2u

Id. at 196-204.
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
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CONCLUSION

The rule that res judicata may not apply to denials of relief
on habeas corpus is no longer viable. It serves no valid function
since a denial of relief is now subject to review by right of appeal.8 9
Moreover, relitigation of issues by the district court, already ruled
upon by the court of appeals, creates administrative confusion.
And there are ample exceptions to foreclosure of relitigation to
dispel any fears of an unjust incarceration based simply on the
technicality of res judicata.iio
Issues that could or should have been litigated, but were not,
should be barred by res judicata, assuming a liberal interpretation
of could or should have brought to avoid any unjust results.
The rule' that res judicata may not apply to habeas corpus at
all is a misstatement of the common law rule that leads to the
absurd result that no issues, relating to jurisdictional or constitutional claims may ever become final prior to the habeas process,
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2255 (1970).
210
The issue may be reconsidered, e.g., where there is newly discovered evidence, Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226-227 (1969) (motion to vacate);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (habeas corpus); FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b);
F. JAMES, JR., supra note 11, §11.1; where there is an allegation of fraud or deceit,
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); F. JAMES, JR., supra note 11, § 11.1; where the prosecution
illegally suppressed evidence, Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd, sub nom. Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 865 (1970); where there is an allegation of incompetency of counsel, Hall v.
Wainright, 441 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1971); Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007 (1970); Barnes v. Florida, 402 F.2d 63 (5th Cir.
1968); Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); and Whitaker v. Warden, 362
F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1966); where there has been a change in the law affecting petitioner's case, Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174 (1947) (dictum); or where:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Townsend v. Sain, supra at 313. All but category (3) have been held applicable to
federal prisoners' petitions. Kaufman v. United States, supra at 226. Moreover,
"[uln all other cases where the material facts are in dispute, the holding of such a
hearing is in the discretion of the district judge." Townsend v. Sain, supra at 318;
Kaufman v. United States, supra at 227.
2"
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thereby, making the habeas process an automatic and required
review. Its application to the criminal appeal or to certiorari to the
criminal appeal would require a restatement of the rule, i.e., that
res judicata may not apply to denials of relief on criminal appeal
or to denials of relief on certiorari to the criminal appeal.
For purposes of stating the proper bar and its limitations, a
distinction must be made between state and federal prisoners. The
law respecting state prisoners ought to conform to the theories
developed pursuant to the statute of 1867 and the supremacy
clause. This simply means that if res judicata or collateral estoppel
is to be avoided, the avoidance mechanism should not be based on
the common law rule, but on the necessity for uniformity of federal
law or the necessity to protect state prisoners from inadequate
fact-finding procedures. None of these arguments is applicable to
federal prisoners. Thus, denials of relief on criminal appeal or certiorari to the criminal appeal for federal prisoners ought to be final,
barring the district court from litigating issues actually decided by
its superior courts.
Since the common law rule has been misapplied in the above
situation, rejection of this rule's applicability will require reexamination of the proper relation of the criminal process to the habeas
or 2255 process in order to determine the proper bar to relitigation.
Both habeas corpus and motion to vacate have been considered
separate causes of action from the preceding criminal processes. If
this analysis is maintained, then res judicata does not become an
available bar simply because the common law rule is held to be
inapplicable. Rather, the proper bar would be collateral estoppel,
i.e., only issues actually adjudicated in the criminal process should
be barred from the habeas or 2255 process. Again there are reasons
to exclude this bar from state prisoners' petitions due to the supremacy clause, but no such limitation stands in the way of such
a bar for federal prisoners. Certainly, the purpose of collateral
review, like the purpose of criminal appeal, is to insure the integrity of the trial process; therefore, caution should be exercised in
permitting collateral estoppel to apply to issues adjudicated at the
criminal trial that have never been reviewed by any means subsequent to the criminal trial since the trial process would be virtually
unreviewable and, thereby, free from any insurance of its integrity.
More important, collateral review by the trial court, where the
issues have never been reviewed by a superior court, does not create any administrative confusion or conflict of authority between
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the district court and its superior court. The only issue is whether
such litigation is abusive.
Under the above analysis, issues that could or should have
been litigated previously, but were not, are not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. They may, however, be controlled by
equitable principles. Where there is no finding of bad faith or
intentional bypass, the failure to litigate timely should not be penalized simply to protect the court from time-consuming litigation
since such protection should be balanced against the potential loss
of life or liberty to the petitioner. Here, the Supreme Court cases
are anomolous: the right to seek collateral review has been granted
more freely where issues have already been litigated once, but has
been granted less generously where issues have not previously been
litigated, thus, denying petitioners opportunity for a full and fair
hearing on all matters that may have bearing on the validity of
their incarceration . This anomoly is difficult to explain since motion to vacate serves no distinct function when the 2255 forum is
called upon to review the same issues of law on the same facts as
those considered in the appellate criminal process. Motion to vacate becomes distinctive when it is used to consider evidence or
issues of law that may have merit, though they were not considered
in the criminal process. Here, the traditional liberality of habeas
corpus would seem to have its proper place.
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